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DETERRENCE THEORY AND ANOMIE 
CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Overview
This dissertation examines the role of deterrence theory and the 
subjective component of anomie theory (anomia) as explanations for two 
types of rule violating behavior: cheating and stealing. While the pri­
mary purpose of this study is to ascertain the explanatory power of these 
theories, a secondary goal is to investigate the possibility of an 
eventual theoretical synthesis of the deterrence and anomie perspectives.
The argument is made that utilitarian philosophy, the intellectual 
bedrock of deterrence theory, calls for an examination of the rewards, or 
benefits, associated with a particular act as well as the perceived costs 
of that behavior. To date, deterrence theorists have focused almost exclu­
sively on costs or punishments and have all but neglected the rewards 
associated with behavior. The introduction of anomie theory (in the form 
of anomia) is an attempt to be more consistent with the basic utilitarian 
position for explaining human behavior; i.e., behavior is the result of 
the actor's perception of the rewards and costs associated with some con­
templated furture action. If perceived rewards outweigh perceived costs, 
the act in question will be undertaken; if costs outweigh rewards, the act 
will be rejected. While anomia (the disjuncture between desired goals and
the actor's perception of the availability of means necessary to achieve 
these goals) is not a "reward" in the usual sense of the word, it may 
nonetheless like a reward, be thought of as a generative factor, i.e., a 
factor that produces, causes or in some way acts to motivate an individual 
to engage in deviant behavior.
The logic of utilitarian thought leads us to deduce that contem­
plated behavior will not be undertaken, no matter how small or inconsequen­
tial perceived costs may be, if the actor sees no reason for engaging in 
that act; i.e., if he perceives no reward or gain associated with the 
behavior in question. In similar fashion, no matter how small the costs 
may appear (perceived punishment associated with an act), the individual 
will fail to engage in rule violating behavior in the absence of some 
generative factor.
What we have done, then, is to substitute a generative factor 
(anomia) for rewards in one of the basic utilitarian propositions. lŸhile 
utilitarians and their contemporary descendants - exchange theorists - 
speak of rewards and costs, this study examines the relationship between a 
generative factor (anomia) and two inhibitory factors (moral commitment to 
norms and fear of punishment).
In an attempt to examine this issue and move toward an integration
of anomie and deterrence theory, we advanced three hypotheses. The final,
and most crucial hypothesis is as follows:
People will engage in rule violating behavior only under the 
pressure of the generative factor (anomia). In other words, the 
generative factor is a necessary condition for deviance. Thus, 
prohibitive factors influence rule violating behavior only when 
anomia is high. IVhen anomia is low, there should be no relation­
ship between prohibitve factors and rule violating behavior.
The data utilized consisted of approximately 300 questionnaires 
administered to undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma. The 
students, both upper and lower division, were enrolled in a variety of 
social science and business courses. The nature of the data allowed us to 
use multiple regression techniques as the primary method of analysis.
In regard to the hypothesis of central importance, we discovered 
that anomia need not be present for the occurrence of self reported vio­
lations. In other words, anomia is not a necessary condition for deviant 
behavior as we had predicted. We also learned that prohibitive factors do 
not influence rule violating behavior solely under the condition of high 
anomia. The central hypothesis of this research was, therefore, rejected.
It is concluded, on the basis of our analysis, that anomia as 
operationalized and measured in this study, is not the generative factor 
that best accounts for classroom cheating and stealing behavior. Possible 
explanations for the observed weak relationahip between anomia and the 
rule violating behavior are offered. Looking at the inhibitory variables, 
the best predictor of self reported violations was found to be moral 
commitment. Implications of this finding are also discussed.
Introduction
Social scientists have long been concerned with the problem of 
order. This fundamental sociological question can be analytically broken 
down into two parts: (1) how is order maintained in human collectivities
from small groups to large societies, and (2) what causes this order to 
break down and sometimes disintegrate? How do we account for disruptions 
in society varying from individual acts of deviance to large-scale collec­
tive violence? The answers to these questions represent a wide range of
sociological' traditions with functionalism and conflict theory being the 
two most paramount persepctives.
In the 1920's and 30's sociologists began to express an interest 
in a particular type of disruptive order-threatening behavior— crime.
They focused their attention on the forces in society that generated 
criminal and deviant behavior: disorganization (Chicago School), anomie
and deviant subcultures. IVhile sociologists did express an interest in 
the control and evaluation of crime, it appears they devoted most of their 
energy to developing explanations for the genesis of criminal behavior.
Of the efforts aimed at the control of criminal behavior during
j''
this period perhaps the most well known was the Chicago Area Project 
(Kobrin, 1966: 473-482). This delinquency prevention program was con­
ceived and administrated by University of Chicago sociologists under the 
leadership of Clifford Shaw. This project reflected the ecological and 
social-psychological perspective of the Chicago scholars. Control of 
delinquency, it was believed, could best be accomplished by community 
reorganization and community action.
Arguments for the use of punishment as a mechanism of social con­
trol, and specifically as a deterrent, were well understood by these 
sociologists. This is evident from the writings of Edwin Sutherland 
(Schuessler, 1973: 167-185) still the foremost name in American crimino­
logy. However the punishment alternative was rejected by Sutherland in 
favor of a treatment strategy. According to Schuessler (1973: 148),
Sutherland believed that "ultimately the crime problem can be solved only 
on the level of the local community through changes in the social organi­
zation of the people who live in it."
Deterrence Theory and Utilitarian Thought
In the past ten to fifteen years, sociologists have renewed their 
interest in the inhibitory effects of punishment. Deterrence theorists, 
as these scholars are now called, acknowledge and intellectual debt to 
utilitarian thinkers.
The system of thought known as utilitarianism is quite old and its 
origin more or less obscure (Parsons, 1937: 51). A number of thinkers
are associated with this position, the most significant of whom are David 
Hume, Adam Smith, Jeramy Bentham and J. S. Mill (Camic, 1979). According 
to Camic, utilitarianism has come to mean, or be associated with all of 
the following: (1) a model of society composed of egoistically motivated
individuals who pursue their material ends with rational means (he 
believes this to be Parsons (1937) interpretation of the utilitarian posi­
tion); (2) the collective ideas of Bentham, James and J. S. Mill and their 
followers who called themselves "Philosophical Radicals"; and (3) an 
ethical principle stating that acts are viewed as morally good, "whose 
consequences tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of 
individuals."
The utilitarian thought of David Hume is significant in that it 
influenced the later works of Benthem (Bronowski and Mazlich, 1960: 435)
and Beccaria (Becker and Bames, 1961: 551), both of whom are associated
with the classical school" of criminology. This school of thought is 
reflected in and serves as the intellectual foundation for contemporary 
deterrence theory. Although the complex philosophies of these two men 
cannot be analyzed in any depth, considering the scope and direction of 
this paper, some of their more basic and important ideas must be mentioned.
The first line of Benthams Principles of Morals and Legislation 
outlines his fundamental position concerning the nature of human nature. 
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do 
as well as what we shall do." For Bentham, intelligent, rational, calcu­
lating free willed human beings attempt to maximize pleasure and minimize 
pain. The ideal government should also work on this maximization—  
minimization principle and would move toward the achievement of these ends 
through the administration of sanctions. "There were four sanctions or 
pains and pleasures annexed to actions: the physical or natural, the
political, moral or popular and religion" (Bronowski and Mazlich, 1960:
437). Of these sanctions only political punishment was to be imposed by 
the government. While punishment in itself was evil, it was considered a 
necessary evil. The administration of sanctions by the state could 
prevent some greater wrongdoing. Bentham also developed a mathematical 
system of pleasure and pain or "felicific calculus." He argued that 
punishment would act as a deterrent to the extent that it was certain, 
swift and severe (Chambliss, 1966).
Beccaria, the 18th century Italian humanitarian, lived and wrote 
in a period of intellectual turmoil and when the philosophical under­
pinnings of both church and state were being attacked (Void, 1979: 20;
Cressey, 1979). Beccaria's most famous work. Essay on Crimes and Punish­
ment, was "a severe criticism of the contemporary criminal law and its 
administration, a plea for rational correspondence of the gravity of crime 
and the severity of punishment and an eloquent denunciation of torture, 
secret accusations and indiscriminate capital punishment" (Hall, 1964 in
Cressey, 1979). A few of Beccarias more important ideas have been sum­
marized by Void (1979: 24-25).
1. The state has the right to punish.
2. Pain and pleasure are the basis of human motivation.
3. The act and not the intent is the measure of injury done by crime.
4. Punishment is desireable only as it helps prevent crime.
5. The use of imprisonment should be more fully employed.
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of utilitarian thought, as it is
reflected in the classical school of criminology, focuses on the important 
question of "criminal responsibility." From this free will perspective, 
criminal responsibility rests clearly and completely with the individual, 
"Essentially unaffected by social consideration or pressures in his 
choices" (Becker and Bames, 1961: 529). Man exercises his freedom of
choice as he systematically accepts and rejects various courses of action. 
This non-deterministic philosophy was a tacit rejection of any explana­
tions using causal factors either internal or external to the actor in 
accounting for criminal behavior. It logically follows from this "free 
will" individual responsibility position that rational human beings could 
be deterred from criminal activity through the utilization of force and 
force threat.
A criminology grounded in positivism was ushered in by the 
Italians (Lombroso, Ferri and Garofalo) in the nineteenth century and was 
a radical departure from the "free will" classical school perspective.
The most important feature of positivism was its application of the 
scientific method (observation, experimentation, the quantification and 
manipulation of data) to the phenomenon under consideration. Rejecting 
the free will position of the classicists, the positivists attempted to
discern the "causes” of crime. As a positivist criminology began to take 
shape and to gain adherents and recognition (the early biological orienta­
tion of the Italians was to be replaced by a sociological criminology), 
there was a corresponding decline in the interest of punishment as a 
mechanism of social control. If criminal behavior was the result of 
(i.e., caused by) forces either internal or external to the actor that 
were to a greater or lesser extent beyond his control, the use of punish­
ment as a mechanism of control made little sense and would be, for the 
most part, ineffective.
For most of this century criminology has been dominated by 
sociological theories of crime causation. However, as one observer has 
noted, in recent years criminological interest has shifted "to an over­
whelming concern for political control of crime and criminals" (Cressey, 
1978, 1979) Cressey is obviously referring to the proliferation of 
deterrence research over the past few years.
The ground breaking for this new era of deterrence research began 
with a series of articles written in the late sixties. Jack Gibbs (1968) 
found (with states as the unit of analysis) that, both certainty and 
severity of imprisonment are inversely related to criminal homicide rates, 
with the association between certainty of imprisonment and the homicide 
rate the stronger of the two. Charles Tittle (1969) examined the relation 
between certainty and severity of punishment and the incidence of various 
kinds of crimes. Using states as his unit of analysis. Tittle calculated 
the crime rates for the seven felonies categorized by the FBI in the 
Uniform Crime Reports. He found that for all crimes taken together there 
is an inverse relation betwen certainty of punishment and the crime rate.
Jensen (1969) focused on the individual's perception of the 
severity and certainty of punishment. The belief that law breakers are 
apprehended and punished was found to be "negatively related to both 
official and self-reported delinquency and positively related to respect 
for the law and police."
Capital Punishment
These findings contradicted past studies dealing with the deterrent 
effect of punishment (Sutherland 1925, Schuessler 1952, Campion 1925,
Graves 1956, Sellin 1955, 1959 and Savitz 1958).^ Most of the early 
deterrence research dealt with the relation between capital punishment 
and homicide rates. The findings were consistent— capital punishment is 
no more effective in deterring homicide than the threat of life in prison.
It was only with the recent renewed interest in deterrence that these 
past studies were re-examined and subsequently challenged.
Bailey (1974), after a careful examination of some of the studies 
mentioned above, surmises that they are inconclusive, suffering from a 
"number of serious theoretical and methodological shortcomings." Tullock 
(1974), an economist, describes these early capital punishment studies as 
"extremely primitive statistically." Ehrlich (1975) another economist, 
using more sophisticated statistical techniques found, "a very sizeable 
deterrence payoff to the death penalty for murder."
Almost all of these early studies concentrated on only one aspect 
of punishment--severity--and only one offense— homicide. Very little atten­
tion was paid to the certainty of punishment. Consequently, only one
Ï
The works of Sellin, Campion, Savitz and Graves can be found in 
The Death Penalty in America by Hugo Adam Bedaue, Anchor Books, Garden City, 
New York 1967.
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aspect of the deterrence equation was tested. Since there is some evidence 
that the frequency of the application of punishment may be more important 
than its severity in r^'ucing rule-violating behavior, the effectiveness of 
capital punishment should not have been ruled out, for it has never ade­
quately been put into practice. As one researcher put it, "the lesson to 
be learned from capital punishment is not that punishment does not deter, 
but that the improper and sloppy use of punishment does not deter or reha­
bilitate." (Jeffrey 1965: 294).
It is possible that some sociologists may have generalized what 
they interpreted as the ineffectiveness of capital punishment in the 
early studies to the inability of punishment to deter criminal and deviant 
behavior of every kind. Jack Gibbs (1968: 516) it would appear, has
arrived at this conclusion, "Execution is, after all, only one type of 
punitive reaction to crime, but sociologists tend to extend opinions on 
the death penalty to punitive reactions generally. "
Deterrence Research
Deterrence researchers soon realized that there were other reasons 
why individuals did not engage in deviant and criminal behavior besides a 
fear of formal sanctions— i.e., stigmatization by group members, with­
drawal of respect and approval by significant others, etc. Other 
researchers saw conforming behavior as a result of actors being held in 
check by their commitment to the normative order rather than a fear of 
either formal or informal sanctions. The notion of moral commitment, so 
important in the work of Parsons and his followers, was incorporated into 
deterrence research.
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Still other researchers focused on the type of norms in question. 
Most people do not engage in murder or armed robbery because these acts 
are viewed as being wrong in and of themselves i.e., they are malum in se. 
Smoking marijuana on the other hand is looked at by a substantial number 
of people as wrong only to the extent that it is illegal— i.e., malum 
prohibitum. Rules of this type lack support based on moral commitment 
and are forced to "stand alone."
There are numerous generative factors explicitly or implicitly 
fond in a variety of sociological theories in the area of crime and 
deviance. Conflict theory posits a struggle for dominance as the motiva­
ting force resulting in deviant and criminal behavior. The Chicago School 
saw social disorganization— the product of rapid growth, urbanization, 
and industrialization--as leading to the breakdown of values and norms and 
eventually to deviant behavior. Subcultural theories argue that individuals 
conform to the values and norms of groups that deviate from the value system 
of the larger society. The desire for acceptance and prestige by members 
of deviant subcultures, although no different from nondeviants, leads to 
rule-violating behavior.
The generative factor to be considered in this dissertation is 
grounded in anomie theory. There are at least three reasons for choosing 
this perspective: First, Anomie theory has a long, rich tradition in
sociology in general and the area of crime and deviance in particular.
From Durkheim, through Merton to Cloward and Ohlin and other contemporary 
researchers, anomie theory has had a substantial impact on American socio­
logy. (2) In the past thirty years a considerable amount of empirical 
work has been done in this area. Anomie as used in this study will hope­
fully add to this body of knowledge and also remedy some of its
12
shortcomings. (3) The operationalization and measurement of anomie used 
in this study fits well within the "perceptual" approach which has become 
the dominant perspective in contemporary deterrence research.
Even a cursory review of the deterrence literature reveals that 
researchers in this area have made no attempt to unite theories focusing 
on the generative variables associated with rule-violating behavior with 
theories of social control. Generative factors are those factors that are 
instrumental in causing, producing, or in some way bringing about rule- 
violating behavior. The inhibitory variables that we will focus on have 
been utilized by numerous researchers in previous studies. Inhibitory 
factors may be defined as those factors that restrain, prohibit, or in 
some capacity function to prevent the occurrence of deviant behavior. The 
punitive inhibitory variables (both formal and informal), along with moral 
commitment are readily found in the deterrence literature (Jensen, 1969, 
Waldo and Chiricos 1972, Burkett and Jensen 1975, Silberman 1976, Kraut 
1976, Meier and Johnson 1977, Teevan 1976, a, b, c). This research will 
attempt to shed light on deviant and conforming behavior within the 
basic utilitarian perspective--i.e., to bring back in, so to speak, the 
previously neglected generative factor.
General Hypotheses
In this dissertation the inhibitory factors as well as the genera­
tive aspects of conforming and rule-violating behavior will be examined.
To date, emphasis in research has been almost exclusively on the prohibi­
tive factors. This has resulted in an incomplete picture of deviant 
behavior and the subsequent control of such behavior. To more fully under­
stand the effects of punishment, both its strengths and weaknesses in the
13
control of rule-violating behavior, we must learn not only how the actor 
perceives negative sanctions but also what motivates him to deviate. To 
this end, an integration of anomie theory and the deterrence doctrine has 
been attempted.
The fundamental position of this dissertation will be that inhibi­
tory variables have a greater effect on behavior when the motivation to 
deviate— in this case anomia--is high. In the absence of anomia, people 
will not engage in illegal behavior even if they score low on measures of 
the inhibitory variables. In other words, punishment will act as a deter­
rent only in those cases where individuals are motivated to deviate. In 
those instances where amonia is low, the threat of punishment will have 
little affect on behavior.
Dissertation Outline
The overall sociological perspective, as it relates to crime and 
deviance, consists of numerous theoretical positions and conceptualizations. 
Our knowlegde of the social world is enhanced and the discipline as a 
whole moves forward not only when new paradigms are introduced but also 
when existing ones are successfully integrated, as previously mentioned, 
the aim of this dissertation is a move toward the integration of a genera­
tive theory of deviance (anomie) and a soical control perspective (the 
deterrence doctrine).
The first step toward accomplishment of this task will be to elab­
orate the deterrence doctrine and place it within the larger framework of 
social control. This will allow us to examine the extent to which punish­
ment and the threat of punishment have been considered mechanisms of social 
control by American sociologists. A review of the deterrence literature
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will provide a brief history of the development of force-threat as a 
mechanism of social control, as well as indicate the strengths and weak­
nesses of the various research strategies used by deterrence theorists.
An argument will be made for the superiority of the "perceptual" approach, 
the methodological strategy used in this research.
Anomie theory, the generative factor of interest, will also be 
examined. Of specific concern will be the relationship between anomie 
and anomia. Some of the major empircal works on anomie will be closely 
scrutinized. It will be argued that the vast majority of these studies 
suffer in the operationalization and measurement of "goals" and "means" 
the crucial components in modern anomie theory. A "new" measure of 
anomia will also be presented.
In an attempt to integrate anomie and deterrence theory, a study 
of 300 university students was conducted. A survey instrument was 
designed to tap respondents' perceptions of the certainty and severity of 
both formal and informal punishments as they relate to two rule violating 
acts--classroom cheating and stealing. Other items measured the degree 
of anomia individuals experienced. Finally self reports of cheating and 
stealing were obtained. Nfultiple regression techniques were utilized to 
test three specific hypotheses.
CHAPTER II
THE PLACE OF DETERRENCE THEORY IN THE 
STUDY OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Social Control and Sociology
The concept of social control is grounded in the sociological 
adaptation of Darwinism (Pitts 1968). Where Darwin saw a basic dichotomy 
between organisms and nature, theories of social control originally 
focused on what was believed to be an inherent conflict between the 
individual and society. Control theories argued that if society were to 
survive, the animal nature in man had to be controlled. These base ten­
dencies that were expressed in each individual pursuing his own self 
interest would lead to a Hobbesian "state of nature", i.e., a war of all 
against all. The focus on social control also signalled a decline in 
utilitarian-grounded theories that postulated a notion of the "natural 
harmony of self interest" (Janowitz 1976).
The term "social control" was introduced into the literature by 
Small and Vincent in 1894 (Hollingshead 1941).^ The first book to deal 
with the subject was Ross’ Social Control: A Survey of the Foundation of
Order, published in 1901. In this work Ross makes a distinction between 
a "natural society" and a "class-based society." In a "natural society"
2Pitts argues that social control is basically an American term 




order is maintained, "when basic human impulses are able to work them­
selves out without interference" (Martindale 1960). Ross believed that 
men were biologically endowed with a sense of sympathy, sociability and 
committed to justice and fair play. Under "favorable conditions" these 
characteristics which manifest themselves in the personalities and actions 
of men "work out by themselves a true natural order, that is to say, an 
order without design or art."
The polar opposite of natural societies are class-based societies 
oriented toward the interest of a particular dominant class. In this 
situation one class lives at the expense of the entire community and 
"we no longer have social control in the true sense, but class control." 
This change in mechanism of control is a direct result of the evolution of 
societies. More complex societies give way to impersonality and contrac­
tual relations as a result of man's weakening "social instincts." When 
this happens self interest replaces group interest.
Society at this critical transitional point was faced with 
the problem of implementing these weakened moral obligations 
with social mechanisms to control the selfish individuals' 
relations with others. Therefore, as "natural communities" 
gave way to "artificial civilized societies" social controls 
took the place of man's instinctive controls in regulating 
conduct and assuring to the individual, safety, and to the 
society, order and continuity (Hollingshead 1941: 218).
It appears, then, that the more civilized society becomes, the more need
it has for the social control of its institutions and members. For Ross
the amount of social control in society was both increasing and inevitable.
As societies grow and become more complex, human interaction that 
was previously spontaneous and unforced changes, via institutionalization, 
to interaction that is forced and coercive. Although Ross was primarily 
interested in the coercive elements of control in industrial societies, he
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was also impressed by the control functions of persuasion and manipula­
tion.
An interesting treatment of social control may be found in the 
works of Charles Horton Cooley, W. I. Thomas and George Herbert Mead. As 
founders of the interactionist approach they greatly contributed to our 
understanding of the development of the self and self control. Self con­
trol is an important and effective mechanism for regulating human behavior. 
The product of interaction, self control is social in nature and not merely 
an idiosyncratic device.
Sociologists in the heyday of the Chicago School, 1920-1932 
(Paris 1967], were also interested in social control. Park, Burgess and 
their colleagues were concerned with the shift of social control from 
primary to secondary groups, especially the criminal justice system and 
political organizations. Social control is the outcome of social organi­
zation. lŸhen this organization breaks doim, mechanisms of control also 
falter, resulting in deviant and criminal behavior. The rapid growth of 
cities populated by numerous, often disparate, groups resulted in unstable 
primary relations, disorganization and, inevitably deviance.
Beginning in the late thirties, functionalist sociologists increas­
ingly became concerned with the issue of social control. In "The Social 
System" Parsons (1951) dealt at length with this concept. Parsons (and 
shortly after him. La Pierre) limited the concept of social control to 
the control of deviance. This is a rather significant step. Prior to 
Parsons, social control had been a rather loosely defined, all encompassing 
concept. Social control had been used synonymously with social order, 
social organization and socialization. Any technique or strategy, inten­
tional or unintentional, by which an individual or group attempted to
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control the behavior of another individual, fell under the rubric of 
social control.
For Parsons, deviance is the motivated tendency to behave in a 
manner that is contrary to institutionalized norms and values. Social 
control consists of mechanisms by which deviant motivation and deviant 
behavior tend to be controlled or counteracted. To be deviant one must 
first be committed to a normative standard and then depart via motivated 
action from that standard. For Parsons the phenomenon of deviance is 
quite straightforward: no original committment— no deviance--no social
control.
Social control in a sense quite distinct form that of Parsons is 
also an integral aspect of the labelling perspective. While labelling 
theorists offer an explanation for deviance and social control that is 
at odds with their functionalist colleagues it is more accurate to say 
that they [labelling theorists) re-constitute [or constitute differently) 
the meaning of these terms. The major assumptions and sources of dif­
ference between the functionalists and labelling perspective have been 
explicated and examined by Wright and Randall [1979). The three major 
areas of disagreement identified by these authors are: [1) the temporal
element concerning the relation between "rule existence" and "behavioral 
violation", [2) The distinction between "norm" and "rule" and, [3) the 
qualitative difference between deviant and nondeviant acts."
For functionalists norms exist in the social system and in the 
minds of actors prior to their violation. Deviant behavior is behavior 
that departs from or is contrary to some pre-existing normative standard. 
"However the labelling theorists assume exactly the opposite time sequence:
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behavior occurs and then [perhaps) a rule is invoked and the behavior is 
reacted to as deviant." (Wright and Randall 1979: 220)
The term "norm", a fundamental sociological concept, is especially 
significant and of central importance to functionalist theorists. A norm 
is a "verbal description of the concrete course of action thus regarded 
as desireable, combined with an injunction to make certain future actions 
conform to this course." (Parsons 1937: 75) Norms, learned and internal­
ized via the socialization process are shared with a community of actors 
who collectively comprise a moral system. Individuals deviate from norma­
tive standards when as Wright and Randall put it, they find themselves in 
a "moral bind." "Deviance occurs when the system is disequillibrated in 
such a manner that the actor is placed under pressure or strain which 
force him to violate one set of normative expectations or another."
(Wright and Randall 1979: 221) The most well known functionalist expla­
nation of system strain resulting in deviance is Robert Merton's (1968) 
"Social Structure and Anomie".
Advancing an interactionist perspective, labelling theorists focus 
on rules as opposed to norms. Where norms are relatively "fixed" and
"stable" rules are in a state of flux "open to interpretation, negotiation
and modification." Rules, unlike norms, are not necessarily shared and, 
in fact, may be imposed on an unknowing and/or uncommitted actor. Label­
ling theorists argue that no act in and of itself constitutes deviance, 
but rather behavior becomes deviant only when it is reacted to in a 
specific manner. "From the labelling perspective deviance is constituted 
by reaction to the behavior as deviant--not by the behavior itself. Hence
deviance is not an act, it is an interactive relationship." (Wright and
Randall 1979: 224)
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Examining the qualitative difference between deviant and con­
forming behavior, the labelling perspective leads us to a rather unique
position. If the determining factor in ascertaining if an act will be 
considered deviant or not is the reaction to that act then no special 
etiological explanation need be advanced to account for that behavior. 
Functionalist theorists obviously view this matter quite differently.
Norm violating behavior is deviant whether or not there is a reaction to 
it, and, therefore, an explanation must be put forth to account for 
that behavior. For functionalists deviant behavior is the product of 
deviant motivation. Deviant motivation, in turn, is the result of various 
types of strain within the social system and/or the individual actor 
himself.
The post-World War II years saw the emergence of conflict theory 
as one of the more dominant paradigms in American sociology. Conflict 
sociologists are also quite interested in social control. Unlike Parsons, 
however, they do not limit social control to the area of deviant behavior 
although this is of particular interest to some members of the conflict 
school. Most of these theorists conceive of social control in terms of 
the question, "how is social order attained?" While functionalists of 
visualize society as a social system held together by the shared goals,
values, and norms of its members, conflict theorists view society as a
social arena comprised of various groups, each with a divergent network 
values, norms and interests, competing for dominance.
If society is characterized by discensus and not consensus, change 
rather than stability, conflict as opposed to harmony, how then is it 
held together— how is order possible? The ultimate form of social control
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in any society, and one on which conflict theorists place grate emphasis, 
is power— power not in the Weberian sense of authority, but power based on 
force and force threat [Goode 1972). The ruling class, through its control 
of the state, dominates, subjugates, and systematically explits the lower 
classes. The capitalist class through its management of the police and 
military, can maintain order and control through force threat and, if 
necessary, implementation of force.
No society of any consequence, however, can function effectively 
for any prolonged period of time if its sole mechanism for maintaining 
order is force or force threat. Confiait theorists also include sociali­
zation as a crucial component of social control. Although the relation­
ship between the dominant and subordinate class is basically an exploita­
tive one, the oppressed class obediently and willingly (most of the time) 
conforms to standards of behavior that maintain this relationship.
Through the socialization process, the oppressed class has come to believe 
one or more of the following: (1) there are no class distinctions, i.e.,
everyone is equal (2) if class differences do exist, they are not signifi­
cant or insurmountable, and (3) position, power and prestiege are achieved 
rather than ascribed statuses, (4) the existing system of stratification 
is legitimate and their position within the system as just.
This "false consciousness," or inability to perceive one's "true" 
objective position in relation to the modes of production, is a powerful 
mechanism of social control. It keeps most people in line most of the 
time. Coercive measures of control, force and force threat, will come 
into play on a large scale only in the latter phase of any historical 
epoche. For example, force will become more widely used and eventually 
less effective as we move into the period of advanced capitalism.
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Variations of this theme can be seen in the works of Marx, Dahrendorf, 
and Quinney.
The deterrence doctrine, like conflict theory, is another per­
spective that focuses on force and force threat as a mechanism of social 
control. The deterrence perspective, however, is much narrower in scope. 
Although grounded in the macro theoretical frameowrk of utilitarianism 
and exchange theory the deterrence doctrine per se does not address itself 
to questions concerning the struggle for power, causes and consequences 
of class conflict, social change etc. Of fundamental concern to the 
deterrence researcher is the degree to which force and force threat can 
successfully deter people from engaging in rule-violating behavior: i.e.,
the extent to which punishment is an effective mechanism of social control.
Conflict sociologists utilize concepts such as power, coercive 
force, and repression extensively and sometimes seemingly interchangeably. 
More often than not, they are loosely defined. Yet, for concepts that 
are such an integral part of the conflict perspective, a systematic 
treatment of the scope, utilization and consequences of force and 
force threat is lacking. To argue that force and force threat are 
mechanisms of social control utilized by the state is probably irrefuta­
ble and also quite useless. General statements and abstract discussions 
of force and the power of the state fail to address the fundamental 
issues concerning these concepts. For example, precisely where is this 
power located, and under what conditions does the state escalate or 
reduce its use of force and force threat? Are these decisions made at 
the local or national level? What is the relation between local and 
national elites, etc?
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The much more narrow, specific question of interest to deter­
rence researchers is what types of punishment or threats of punishment 
are effective in controlling certain patterns of behavior in specific 
groups of people under various conditions. This is the central issue 
that deterrence theorists are investigating.
The deterrence doctrine, like any other perspective, is not 
without its shortcomings. Researchers only recently have concerned 
themselves with the additional inhibitory variables of social dis­
approval, or informal punishement, and moral commitment. These "new" 
inhibitory variables are certainly not novel in sociology. The notion 
of moral commitment is treated extensively in the work of Talcott 
Parsons, while threat of social disapproval, which is predicated on the 
belief that man is a seeker of approval, esteem, and a positive self 
image, has long been a popular theme in American sociology (Wrong 1961).
The threat of social disapproval also provides a link between 
deterrence theory and Sutherlands "differential association." The cru­
cial variable in differential association concerns definitions favor­
able or unfavorable to violation of the law (Sutherland and Cressey 
1978: 81). To the extent that an actor associates with people who
do not violate the law, there is a high probability of social disap­
proval for the individual should he/she violate the law. Conversely, 
there is a lower probability of informal sanctions for the actor where 
associates engage in rule violating behavior.
The overriding question concerning the inhibitory variables 
(punishment both formal and informal and moral commitment) is to what 
extent each is a factor in controlling human behavior. Is formal
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punishment or moral commitment the crucial variable? Perhaps there is 
no key variable but a shifting in the importance of these factor accord­
ing to the behavior, groups, and circumstances in question.
A major shortcoming in deterrence theory and research to date
is that generative factors have been neglected. While we are beginning
to understand the role that inhibitory variables play in controlling 
human behavior we have yet to link etiological theories of crime with 
social control perspectives and test them in any meaningful way. It 
seems reasonable to assume that various generative factors will be dif­
ferentially affected by various combinations of inhibitory variables as 
they apply to specific situations.
Deterrence Theory
From the deterrence perspective, if criminal behavior is to be
curtailed indidviduals must come to believe that costs in the form of
punsihment will outweigh any gain associated with rule-violating conduct. 
The utilitarian position concerning the relation between crime and 
punishment may be reduced to one direct fairly simple statement: 
punishment will deter crime to the extent that it is severe, swift, and 
certain.
The notion that proper levels of and administration of punish-
3ment can deter rule-breaking behavior has been hotly debated. The basic 
tenets of the deterrence doctrine have been uncritically accepted and 
rejected by many. Becuase so little deterrence research was done.
This will be discussed more fully in chapter 2 when deterrence 
research is reviewed.
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positions were taken and argued with little reference to empircal work. 
One of the main reasons for this paucity of research is that the 
phenomenon of deterrence is enmeshed in a methodological quagmire.
Gibbs (1975) argues convincingly that the assertion of the deterrent 
effect of the severity, certainty and celerity of punishment is not 
directly testable. This is because the word deter denotes a phenomenon 
that is not observable, and any assertion that contains the word deter­
rence is by itself untestable. It can only be tested "when transmitted 
into the language of space-time relations or, more specifically, the 
statistical association between properties of punishment and crime."
In a word, operationalizing the relevant concepts (i.e., coming up 
with valid, reliable empirical indicators) so as to test deterrence 
theory is no easy task. Gibbs is arguing, basically, that by defini­
tion the extent of deterrence is unmeasureable.
The fundamental dilema is that of creating a test of deterrence 
assertions that voids evidential problems. Gibbs (1972: 12) master­
fully illuiminates the difficulties inherent in testing the deterrence 
hypothesis:
Consider an individual contemplating an act and assume that 
the individual (1) views the act as contrary to the law (2) knows 
the prescribed pusnihment, (3) perceives the punishment as severe, 
and estimates the actual imposition of the punishment as certain.
If the individual commits the act, then the threat of punishment 
clearly did not deter him or her. However, even if the individual 
refrains, the omission could be attributed to (1) the dictates of 
personal conscience, (2) the individuals recognition of and re­
spect for the social (extralegal) condemantion of the act, and/or 
(3) the fear of some extra legal consequences (e.g., stigma). So 
unless the latter (1), (2), (3) are held constant we have a paradox-- 
regardless of what the individual does (commits or omits the act), 
it is not evidence of deterrence.
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This observation may lead us to believe that the burden of proof 
is irrefutably stacked against the adherents of deterrence theory. How­
ever, the proponents of deterrence theory have also argued convincingly. 
Take, for example, the actor who commits a criminal act even though he 
perceives the punishment associated with that act to be certain, swift, 
and harsh. Opponents will argue that this is a clear-cut example of the 
inability of punishment to deter criminal behavior. However, deter­
rence advocates never have claimed that the threat of punishment will 
deter everyone from committing all types of criminal offenses under 
any and all circumstances. A similar line of reasoning by opponents 
of punishment as a deterrent is commonly found in numerous sociology 
texts. In eighteenth century England, the penalty for picking someone's 
pocket was death by hanging. The story goes that while large crowds 
gathered to watch the public execution of thieves, pick-pockets were 
busy fleecing the audience. This argument is flawed on at least two 
counts: [1] although the severity of the punishment was obviously
high, we have no idea of its certainty and celerity and (2) although 
the rates of crime were at that time reportedly high and increasing, 
it is quite possible that without such a severe punishment they would 
have been even higher. In other words, a substantial number of people 
may have been deterred from picking pockets.
These "evidential debates," as Gibbs refers to them, indicates 
that the effects, if any, of deterrence cannot be directly measured but 
only indirectly measured.^ Part of the controversy and confusion
^The problem of measurement in deterrence research will be 
addressed more fully in the methods section.
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surrounding the deterrence doctrine results from the inability to dis­
tinguish between various types of deterrence. Perhaps the most impor­
tant distinction is between specific and general deterrence.
Specific deterrence refers to the omission or curtailment of 
criminal activity by an individual because that individual has been 
previously punished for rule-violating behavior. The basic principle 
of general deterrence is that punishment of an individual deters others 
from committing the same offense. Unlike specific deterrence, general 
deterrence is not concerned with the punished individual. "It is a 
message addressed to the public at large. The punishement of the 
offender deters others by telling them: 'This will happen to you if 
you violate the law'" (Van Den Haag 1975: 156). General deterrence
protects society be restraining potential offencers who may still be 
deterred. (Durkheim 1960)
A distinction is also made between absolute and restrictive 
deterrence. The term absolute deterrence refers to an individual or 
group, from watching others punished, being completely deterred from 
committing criminal acts because they fear the risk of punishment. 
Restrictive deterrence occurs when individuals curtail their rule- 
violating behavior because they fear that continued repetition of that 
behavior will eventually result in their suffering some punishment.
Using society as a unit of analysis it is hard to imagine that any 
punishment will function (at least for very long) as an absolute 
deterrent--i.e., all people will be deterred all of the time no matter 
what the situation or circumstances. However, it does appear that, 
under some conditions of severity, certainty and celerity of punishment.
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higher levels of restrictive deterrence may be achieved resulting in 
lower rates of criminal behavior.
The concept of deterrence should not be viewed in terms of a 
dichotomy— i.e., punishment deters across the board and is therefore 
effective in controlling all manners of rule-violating behavior, or 
punishment does not deter and is ineffective incontrolling such behavior. 
This line of thought reduces deterrence to a rather simple, either/or, 
"take it or leave it" dichotomy. This false dichotomy eliminates the 
rather large area of possibilities between these two extremes. To think 
that levels of severity, certainty and celerity of punishment can be 
attained to the extent that the rate of crime drops to near zero 
(absolute deterrence) is inappropriate. However, it is just as untenable 
to believe that under no circumstances will punishment have a deterrent 
effect.
General deterrence should be viewed in terms of a continuum with 
the ideal types of "no deterrence" and "absolute deterrence" as polar 
opposites. We may then proceed to try to determine under what conditions 
of punishment certain groups of people in particular situations will be 
deterred from committing specific offenses.
From this brief discussion it should be obvious that the concept 
of deterrence is quite complex and cannot, or at least should not, be 
reduced to one general question: Does punishment have a deterrent
effect? To begin besides legal or formal sanctions, there are other 
factors that have to be taken into consideration. The additional inhibi­
tory variables that have found their way into deterrence research are 
informal punishment and moral commitment. Generative or motivating
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factors that lead to rule-violating behavior must also be considered.
Inclusion of generative factors in the deterrence framework is 
desirable for at least two reasons. First, it is a movement in the 
direction of theoretical integration, linking causal and control per­
spectives of rule-violating behavior. Second, an examination of genera­
tive and control factors simultaneously will aid in determining what 
types of deviant motivation are effectively curtailed by force threat 
and what types of deviant motivations are not.
In the remainder of this chapter, the relevance of informal 
sanction, moral commitment and generative factors to the deterrence 
doctrine will be discussed.
Informal Sanctions
Formal punishments as outlined in the penal code are not the 
only penalties that may deter rule-violating behavior. Fear of informal 
sanctions also may act as a powerful deterrent. The stigma resulting 
from contact with the criminal justice system [being arrested, jailed 
and accused of a crime) may lead to withdrawal of approval, loss of 
respect, ridicule or ostracism by significant others in various primary 
groups. This may be more threatening and subsequently have more of a 
deterrent effect than fear of legal punishment. Radzinowicz and King 
(1977: 132) argue rather convincingly on this point.
And such groups carry their own deterrent sanctions, which 
may be more powerful than those of the criminal law. The 
approval or disapproval of those with whom you live, work, 
share your leisure, interests and affection, have a stronger 
impact than the remoter sanctions of the state, however 
impressive. The small group retains the homogeneity and 
immediacy which the larger remote modem society has lost.
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Social disapproval (informal sanctions) is an especially impor­
tant inhibitory variable because it provides a link between deterrence 
theory and three formidable statements in the area of crime and delin­
quency, Reckless' containment theory (1973) Hirschi's Control Theory and 
Differential Association (Sutherland and Cressey 1978),
The key proposition in Sutherlands theory, as already noted, is 
the notion of definitions favorable or unfavorable to violation of the 
law. It follows from this perspective that associates who provide an 
actor with definitions concerning violations of the law will also provide 
him with information (at least to some extent) concerning the groups 
reaction should he engage in rule violating behavior. For example, the 
actor may internalize definitions favorable to compliance with the law 
and also learn through word or deed thatlaw violations coming to the 
groups attention will be met with negative sanctions of some kind.
However, the actor may internalize definitions favorable to compliance 
with the law and learn from the group's reaction, or lack of reaction, 
that known violations are for the most part ignored; i.e., not met with 
any informal sanctions.
It has also been suggested (Tittle and Logan 1973) that the threat 
of legal punichsment (formal sanctions) is an effective deterrent only 
to the extent that there is a high threat of social disapproval (infor­
mal sanctions). From this perspective legal sanctions act as a deter­
rent because their imposition exposes the offender to his peers who in 
turn subject him to informal sanctions.
Therefore, if one's friends would not impose informal sanc­
tions upon exposure (i.e., low threat of social disapproval),
the threat of legal punishment would not be an effective
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deterrent. Only under the condition of a high threat of social 
disapproval should perceived threat of legal punishment be 
inversely related to involvement in illegal behavior. (Grasmick 
and Green 1979: 9)
Moral Commitment
As alluded to earlier in the remarks by Gibbs, there are other 
factors besides sanction fear which may figure prominently in the 
individual's decision not to engage in rule-violating behavior. Pro­
bably the most important of these additional inhibitory factors is that 
of moral commitment. Through the socialization process people become 
aware of, internalize and become committed to a value or norm to such 
an extent that they normally cannot conceive of acting in a contrary 
manner. From this perspective people do not steal because they believe 
that they will be caught and punished but because stealing is for them 
morally and ethically objectionable. Researchers have tended to look at 
the deterrent effects of punishment and normative commitment as two 
rather mutally exclusive explanations for why people refrain from 
rule-breaking behavior. It could be, however, that the two are more 
related than we now believe.
Let's take a hypothetical example. For one reason or another in 
a particular society the severity, certainty and celerity of punishement 
for a particular criminal offense decreases, resulting in an increase in 
the number of violations for that offense. The individuals who are now 
violating the law are the ones who were previously deterred by fear of 
punishment. As a result of this general increase in the number of 
violations, those individuals who are committed to the norm in question 
may now begin to examine and question their commitment to that norm.
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They may now come to believe that violation is not really very bad or 
serious.
Durkehim addressed this topic in "The Division of Labor in 
Society" (1960: 108). He spoke of the possible demoralization of
"upright people" in light of violations of the collective conscience.
We can thus say without paradox that punishment is above 
all designed to act upon upright people, for, since it serves 
to heal the wounds made upon collective sentiments, it can 
fill this role only where these sentiments exist, and com- 
mensurately with their vivacity.
Jackson Toby (1964) has commented on this important point in 
Durkheim's theory of punisheratn.
He believed that unpunished deviance tends to demoralize 
the conformant and therefore he talks about punishment as a 
means of repairing the wounds made upon collective sentiments.
Durkheim was not entirely clear; he expressed his ideas in 
metaphorical language. Nonetheless, we can identify the 
hypotheses that the punishment of offenders promotes the 
solidarity of conformists. (Toby 1963: 334)
The notion that moral commitment and the threat of punishement 
are mutually exclusive explanations for conforming behavior is best 
expressed in terms of the "conditional" hypothesis. From this perspec­
tive the threat of legal punishment is a potential deterrent only among 
those people who are not morally committed to the law. Those individuals, 
on the other hand, who are comitted to the law will not violate the 
law even if they perceive the certainty and severity of legal sanctions 
as low. Internalization of the law is thought to be such a powerful 
factor that it leaves little if any room for deviant motivation.
It follows from this point of view that the effects of moral 
commitment and perceived threat of legal punishment in rule violations 
are not additive. Instead the deterrent effect of perceived legal
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punishment is contingent upon the level of moral commitment.
The view that moral commitment and deviant motivation are incom­
patible, the fundamental premise of the conditional hypothesis has been 
criticized by Wrong (1961) and Blake and Davis (1964).
What has happened is that internalization has imperceptibly 
been equated with "learning" or even with "habit-formation" in 
the simplest sense. Thus when a norm is said to have been 
"internalized" by an individual, what is frequently meant is 
that he habitually both affirms it and conforms to it in his 
conduct. The whole stress on inner conflict, on the tension 
between powerful impulses and supergo controls the behavioral 
outcome of which cannot be prejudged, drops out of the picture.
(Wrong 1961: 187)
Actually, the concept of internalization does not neces­
sarily imply that the individual always, or typically, 
experiences no conscious desire for, or temptation to engage 
in, contra-nomrative activities. It does not seem necessary 
to assume that "internalization" involves a blocking out of 
deviant motives such as would take place in sublimation and 
repression. Rather, we simply assume that in the face of 
temptation, one source of resistance to acting out deviant 
motivation in deviant behavior lies in the person’s commit­
ment to norms proscribing the behavior, and in his ability 
to sympolize significantly to himself the moral reasons for 
not succumbing. (Blake and Davis 1964: 478)
Blake and Davis argues further that deviant motivation may be 
so high that the actor risks feelings of guilt and engages in rule vio­
lating behavior. In a situation of this nature, "anticipation of for­
mal punishment", one of the five "inhibotors to deviant behavior" dis­
cussed by the authors, may successfully deter some actors. Therefore, 
the threat of formal sanctions should have a deterrent effect even among 
the morally committed.
Generative Factors
To a limited degree, deterrence researchers have considered some 
generative factors, although they have failed to do so in any systematic
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fashion. For example, a distinction has been made between "expressive" 
and "instrumental" crimes. It has been suggested that expressive crimes 
are ends in themselves and, as such, are manifestations of some strong 
personal need or emotion. Actors motivated by rage, anger, depression, 
fear, etc. are temporarily imparied in their ability to reason and, 
therefore, not likely to be deterred by threats of punishment. Other 
crimes, like theft or robbery, that are instrumental, simply means to 
ends, are more likely to be deterred by force threat.
Another genrative factor that has received some attention by 
at least one deterrence researcher (Buikhusen 1975) is the actor's 
position in the opportunity structure of society and his definition of 
the situation concerning that position. An individual who comes to 
believe that he has no acceptable legal alternative to contemplated 
rule-violating behavior may eventually engage in that behavior. In 
this framework the "no other choice" decision brought about by the 
definition of the situation may be seen as a generative or motivating 
factor.
The examples above may be viewed as generative factors in 
only the broadest use of the term. With the exception of Tittle's study 
(1977), more traditional generative factors— i.e., those found in main­
line theories of crime and deviance— have not been considered by 
deterrence researchers. Using the shotgun approach in an exploratory 
study. Tittle used "eight independent variables suggested by extant 
theories to predice self-reported violations." Among the variables 
used were "relative deprivation" (anomie theory) "alienation" (conflict 
theory) and differential association. Unfortunately, the operationaliza­
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tion and measurement of these variables leaves much to be desired, making 
the results somewhat suspect. However, Tittle should be praised for 
breaking new ground in our attempt to more fully understand deviant- 
conforming behavior. The next step is to consider generative theories 
individually, attempting to determine what motivates people to engage 
in specific rule-violating acts and if these acts may be deterred by 
force or force threat.
CHAPTER III
DETERRENCE RESEARCH - A SELECTIVE 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Capital Punishment Studies 
Almost all of the early research in deterrence revolved around 
the debate concerning the abolition or retention of the death penalty. 
Capital punishment studies relied primarily on two basic procedures:
(1) a comparison of homicide rates in death penalty and abolitionist 
states, and (2] comparison of homicide rates in a state before and 
after abolition and réintroduction of the death penalty (Andenaes, 1975). 
Although conducted primarily in the United States, capital punishment 
studies were carried out in a number of other countries including New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada and Great Britain. The overall findings 
were straightforward and consistent— capital punishment is no more 
effective in deterring homicide than is the threat of life in prison.
For Bedau (1967: 264) the issue was settled, "What do all these studies
taken together seem to show? The results are negative; there is no 
evidence to support the theory that the death penalty is a deterrent 
superior to imprisonment for the crime of murder." Sellin (1966) 
reached the same conclusion.
The early capital punishment studies (Scheussler 1952, Savitz 
1958, Sellin 1959, 1967) were to have significant ramifications. In June,
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1972, the Supreme Court of the United States reached a decision in the 
Furman vs. Georgia case. "The court ruled that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional as then administered, with trial judges and juries 
having unguided discretion to sentence to death or life." (Bedau and 
Pierce 1976: XIV) In writing this opinion, the chief justices cited
evidence concerning capital punishment gathered through social science 
research. "As the court’s opinion showed, the evidence carried per­
suasive effect and provided the basic foundation for this decision." 
Clearly capital punishment studies had transcended "mere" scholarly 
interest and academic debate. It was also evident that future court 
decisions would pay close attention to, and be strongly influenced by 
capital punishment research. "The Supreme Court's momentous decision in 
Furman vs. Georgia showed that the nation's highest tribunal would not 
only take judicial notice of the results of social science research on 
the issue of capital punishment, but that it would even ask for addi­
tional information." (Bedau and Pierce 1976 p XX)
Post Furman studies have not resolved the question concerning 
the deterrent effects of capital punishment. Research completed after 
1972 has resulted in contradictory findings. To date, the most contro­
versial work in this area has been done by University of Chicago econo­
mist Isaac Ehrlich. Examining homicide rates and executions in the 
United States between the 1930's and 1960's Ehrlich (1975) concluded that 
"each execution prevented between eight and twenty murders." Ehrlichs' 
entire research procedure, from the data he analyzed to his choice of
statistical techniques, has been sharply critized. (Bowers and Pierce
1975, Passel and Taylor 1976)
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On the other hand, Bailey (1976A 1976B) in an examination of the 
relation between first degree murder, rape and capital punishment found 
no evidence to support the deterrent effect of the death penaly. Parker 
and Smith (1979) in their examination of victim/offender relationships 
in homicide found "little support for the deterrence model."
To what can we attribute these incompatible, seemingly contra­
dictory findings? The answer(s) to this question is probably buried in 
a quagmire of theoretical and methodological issues. It may be that, 
given the nature of the capital punishment-deterrence phenomenon, its 
resolution is not possible. Gibbs and Erickson (1976: 478) suggest
that, because so many "extralegal complexities" have been introduced 
into the question of the deterrent effect of capital punishment, "perhaps 
we have made 'conclusive evidence' an impossibility."
The Ecological Approach to the Study of Deterrence 
Most early deterrence research was carried out at the aggregate 
level. Investigators were interested in the certainty and severity of 
punishment with states as the unit of analysis and crime rates as the 
dependent variable.
Perhaps the groundbreaking for the new era of deterrence research 
was carried out by Gibbs in a 1968 article entitled "Crime, Punishment 
and Deterrence." Gibbs found both certainty and severity of punishment 
to be inversely related to criminal homicide rates. In the following 
years, numerous deterrence articles conducted at the aggregate level 
were published (Tittle 1969; Gray and Martin, 1969; Chiricos and Waldo, 
1970; Bailey and Smith, 1972; Antunes and Hunt, 1973).
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The strategy employed by these researchers was basically the same. 
Severity of punishment was determined by taking the median number of 
months served for a particular offense by all persons in a region 
(usually a state) convicted of that offense. The certainty of punish­
ment was derived by dividing the number of prison admissions for crime 
"X" during a particular period by the number of "X" crimes known to 
police during that same period.
These studies, taken collectively, indicate that certainty of 
punishment is inversely related to crime rates. The strength of the 
relationship, however, varies considerably. The effects of severity 
of punishment as a deterrent are not as clear. Most of the associations 
between severity of punishment and crime rates were in the right 
direction, although of negligible strength.
Sociologists are not the only scholars interested in the rela­
tionship between levels of punishment and crime rates. Economists are 
also doing work in the area of deterrence. Most of these investigators 
begin with the assumption that punishment deters crime (Tullock 1974). 
This is probably a function of their discipline's basic world view and 
perception of the nature of man. From this perspective, rational men 
will consume less of something when costs are increased. The work of 
Ehrlich (1973, 1975) and Becker (1968) indicates the deterrent effects 
of punishment.
McPheters (1976), in an innovative study, attempted to calculate 
not only the realtionship between punishment and rates of crime, but also 
the relationship between gains from robberies and criminal activity.
He found that from 1959 to 1971 the "real average take from robbery"
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in the United States declined approximately 25%. During that same period 
the robbery rate increased by more than 350%. Because robbers may be 
looked at as aiming for "target levels of achievement" additional crimes 
are required to reach their goal. These criminals are not behaving in 
an irrational manner even though their profit margin has been steadily 
declining. This is especially true when one realizes that robbery 
clearance rates declined from 42.5 to 24.6% and the conviction rate 
dropped from 64.8 to 31% in the twelve year period under consideration.
Experiments in General Deterrence
One of the most important, effective and desirable research 
techniques in all of science is the experiment. In an experiment the 
investigator manipulates and controls one or more independent variables 
and then observes the dependent variable(s) for variation concomitant 
to manipulation of the independent variable (Kerlinger 1973: 378). The
fundamental advantage of this technique is the researcher's ability to 
control the relevant variables. To the extent that the experimenter can 
control the pertinent variables, he/she may conclude with a high degree 
of confidence that the variation in the dependent variable(s) is a 
function of the manipulation of the independent variables.
Experiments and "true" experiments^ are a rarity in sociology 
because researchers usually do not have the capacity to manipulate and 
selectively assign the independent variable.
It is for these reasons that so few experiments have been done 
in the area of deterrence. The manipulation of the severity and certainty
^In a true experiment the researcher has the power to randomly 
select subjects and then assign them to various experimental groups.
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of punishment is usually difficult. According to Buikhusen (1974) the 
researcher working to conduct an experimental study in the area of 
deterrence has several problems to overcome. Among these problems are 
the following:
1. How to manipulate deterrence; i.e., the introduction of the 
experimental variable.
2. How to register the behavior of the population at risk 
before and after the experimental variable (deterrenct) has been intro­
duced .
3. How to be sure than an eventual change in behavior has been 
caused by the deterrent and not by other intervening variables.
Buikhusen and his associates decided to carry out an experiment 
to see if punishment had any preventative effect on the behavior of 
motorists driving with worn tires. Two cities of comparable size and 
composition in the Netherlands were selected. In the experimental city, 
the intensive campaign was carried out with the help of local authorities 
and media. Motorists were urged to check for, and replace if necessary, 
any worn tires lest they be stopped by the police and fined. No such 
campaign was conducted in the control city. The results indicated 
twice as many people in the experimental city, as opposed to the control 
city, replaced their worn tires.
Another rather ingenious experiment was conducted by Tittle and 
Rowe (1973) using three introductory sociology classes. One was desig­
nated as a control group while the others received the treatment effects 
during the course of the semester--threat of punishment and a moral 
appeal not to cheat. In all three classes the testing and grading
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system used by the instructor facilitated student cheating. The authors 
found that a moral appeal had no effect on the level of cheating while 
the threat of being caught and punished had a significant deterrent 
effect. "The results appear to support the deterrent argument and to 
demonstrate that fear of sanction is a more important influence than a 
moral appeal in generating conformity to the norm of classroom honesty." 
(Tittle and Rowe 1973: 496)
Shwartz and Orleans (Gibbs 1975: 190-192) interviewed approxi­
mately 400 individuals prior to the 1962 tax filing deadline. The first 
group (sanction threat) was made aware of the penalties for filing false 
reports, while the conscience-appeal group was remineded of the citizen's 
moral duty to pay taxes. The third group (placebo) was interviewed on 
the assumption that the interview situation might have some effect.
The control group was not interviewed but considered in the compara­
tive analysis.
The results revealed that in "comparison to the two control 
groups both treatment groups increased their reported adjusted gross 
income more, increased their total deeuctions less, and increased 
their income tax more." These findings support the deterrence doctrine 
but also suggest that other mechanisms (in this case moral appeal) are 
effective in realizing compliance to norms and rules.
The small number of studies in deterrence utilizing experimental 
designs attest to the difficulties inherent in this type of research.
The problems encountered in manipulating anything more than minor sanc­
tions should be obvious. The other alternative, utilized by Schwartz 
and Orleans, is to manipulate people's perception of sanctions. The
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difficulties in this type of research are only surpassed by the rewards. 
As previously mentioned, the experimental approach allows for the 
greatest degree of control and certainty concerning the validity of 
findings. The future use of this technique in deterrence research 
appears to be a function of the ingenuity and resourcefulness of investi­
gators .
The Perceptual Approach to the Study of Deterrence
The ecological studies in deterrence [which until recently con­
stituted the majority of research in this area) had rather serious 
déficiences as most of their authors readily acknowledged. At least 
three of these drawbacks that led to their decline and the subsequent 
increase in perceptual studies are of sufficient importance to warrant 
some discussion.
Cl) In the first place, these works relied on official statis­
tics in determining the severity and certainty of punishment as well as 
the crime rates in designated areas (usually states). The problem 
encountered in utilizing official statistics are well known and have been 
extensively discussed in the criminological literature.^ One of the 
severest critics of the use of crime statistics in research is W. 
Buickhusen, a criminal justice official in Holland.
By comparing official data with information gathered by anon­
ymous questionnaires we have found several times that official 
records are absolutely unrepresentative for the number and kind 
of offenses actually committed. It is surprising to see time 
and again that many crimonolegists still believe it is better 
to have invalid data than no data.
^For a succinct yet cogent appraisal of criminal statistics see 
the disucssion in Sutherland and Cressey, p. 30-35, "Criminology," 1978.
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(2) The fundamental assumption underlying the philosophy of 
general deterrence is that people can be discouraged from engaging in 
criminal behavior by the manipulation of punishment. It appears that 
people's perception of the severity and certainty of punishment were 
not taken into consideration in most of the early deterrence studies.
The investigators either: (a) took it for granted that people knew
what the certainty and severity of punishment was for a specific crime,
(b] did not consider this phenomenon very important, or (c) were satis­
fied with aggregate-level relationships at this stage of deterrence 
research. I am inclined to accept the last alternative.
Realizing the limitations of aggregate level research, researchers 
began conducting studies concerning the individual's perception of punish­
ment. Researchers began to investigate the actor's perception of the 
certainty and severity of punishment and its association with self- 
reported violations. The unit of analysis was now the individual. This 
was a significant step forward in deterrence research. The importance 
of considering the individual's perception of punishment is nicely sum­
marized by Henshel and Carey (1975: 362).
Deterrence when and if it exists, is a state of mind. If 
the mind in question holds no cognition relative to the punitive 
sanction (e.g., it had not heard of, believed in, or felt appli­
cable) than the objective existence of sanctions with specified 
levels of severity, certainty, swiftness is of no consequence,
. . . deterrence does not exist for this person, but not becuase 
deterrence does not exist. By concentrating on the objective 
properties of legal sanctions, studies have presumed that 
these objective properties are actually correctly conceptualized 
by the people, or at least by a sufficient number of them.
(3) Deterrence researchers became interested in other variables
that were associated with conforming-deviant behavior. Ecological studies 
were limited to the basic relationship between punishment and rates of
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crime. Deterrence investigators expanded their thinking and added new 
variables to the deterrence equation. The most important of these new 
variables are informal sanctions, moral commitment, relative deprivation, 
the nature of the norm in question (male prohibita or male in se) and 
the actor's reference groups.
The limitations of aggregate level studies, an increasing number 
of deterrence investigators, and the addition of new variables all were 
instrumental in this movement away from the ecological line of research.
In the remainder of this chapter we will examine this relatively new 
avenue of inquiry in deterrence research— the perceptual approach.
These works have been classified and reviewed according to the 
primary variable of interest of the researcher.
Communications and Sanctions
If people are to be deterred by the threat of punishment, it is 
obvious that they must have some knowledge of that punishment. Communica­
tion of sanction threat, therefore, is an important aspect of deterrence.
According to Zimring and Hawkins (1973) four conditions must be 
met if punishment in the form of a threat is to be effective in crime 
control. (1) Members of an audience must know that an act is prohibited 
if the prohibition is to affect their conduct. Buikusen (1974) and his 
associates found that 43% of their Dutch sample did not know that smoking 
marijuana was a criminal offense. Even 21% of a sample of drug users 
thought that marijuana and hashish were legal substances.
People often have little knowledge of the punishment associated 
with criminal statutes. The California Study of 1968, commissioned by 
that state's legislature, revealed that people "were extremely ignorant of
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penalties for crime." Of the eleven possible crimes in question, the 
mean number of correct responses in identifying lawful state penalties 
was 2.6. On the whole, people underestimated the severity of current 
pnishments. These studies indicate that a gap exists between criminal 
statutes and people's perception of what constitutes criminal behavior 
and sanctions associated with that behavior. How can punishment deter 
if people do not know what the sanctions associated with particular 
crimes are? People behave in accordance with what they believe to be 
true as opposed to the objective realities of the situation.
(2j Unless it is believed that those who commit rule-violating 
behavior may be punished, the threat of punishment will not affect the 
rate of behavior. In other words, the threat of punishment in and of 
itself is not a sufficient deterrent. Actors must come to believe that 
rule violators will be caught and punished. This is the basic proposi­
tion of the deterrence doctrine— i.e., perceived certainty and severity 
of punishment are inversely related to incidents of rule violating 
behavior.
(3j Unless differences in the level of threatened punishment are 
perceived, increases in penalties can have no meaninful deterrent effect. 
In the Buikhusen experiment, related earlier, the increase in punishment 
was apparently perceived and resulted in a substantial number of people 
replacing their worn tires with new ones. Perception of increased punish­
ment is a necessary although not a sufficient condition in the deterrence 
phenomenon. Buikhusen and his associates found that a significant num­
ber of people who had worn tires and were aware of the stepped-up police 
campaign (increased activity of punishment) had no intention of replacing
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their worn tires.
An addition in the severity of punishment, along with an increased 
perception of that severity by an audience, may result in a reduced deter­
rent effect and/or an increase in the violation of related offenses. In 
a 1976 paper Ross hypothesized that "increases in formal penalties tend 
to be subverted by contrary adjustments in the behavior of those who 
apply the law." Ross reviewed three studies where penalties for driving 
offenses (drunken driving and speeding) were sharply increased. The 
overall affect was not a reduction in the offense rate but rather a 
reduction in the number of arrests and/or convictions for those viola­
tions. Ross suggests that when penalties are sharply and quickly in­
creased and actors in the criminal justice system have discretionary 
power, a mitigation and annulment of the offense takes place. This 
"neutralization of severe sanctions" comes about when the increased 
sanctions are perceived to be in conflict with accepted norms of fairness.
(4) If variations in rates of detection are to serve as marginal 
deterrents, knowledge of those variations must be transmitted in some 
fashion to potential offenders. In other words, information concerning 
the severity and certainty of punishment and subsequent changes in that 
information must be transmitted in some manner.
Parker and Grasmick (1979) examined the effects of two sources of 
information on people's perception of the certainty of arrest in a com­
munity: (1) newspaper crime stories and (2) personal experience with
crime and the personal experience of one's acquaintances. A content analy­
sis of newspaper stories portrayed arrest rates well above the official 
arrest rates (76% and 22% respectively). The authors found no differences
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in the estimated certainty of arrest between those who read newspaper 
regularly and those who did not. "Whatever it is that people get out 
of reading in the newspaper it apparently is not an estimate of the 
certainty of arrest." (Parker and Grasmick 1979: 13) The authors con­
structed a scale for measuring an individual's personal (as perpetrator 
or victim) and interpersonal (friend or acquaintance of a perpetrator 
or victim) direct experience arrest rate and concluded that, "estimates 
of the official certainty of arrest appear to be based to a great 
extent, on personal experiences of the individual and his acquaintances 
with crimes that have not resulted in arrest."
The few studies in the area of communications indicate that 
people by and large do not have a very accurate perception of the cer­
tainty of punishment. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the 
deterrent effect of punishment is reduced or less effective. The extent 
to which people overestimate the certainty of punishment may compensate 
for their underestimation of the severity of punishment.
Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment
Certainty and severity of punishment, the two key variables in 
deterrence theory, probably have received the greatest amount of atten­
tion by investigators working from a "perceptual" orientation. Findings 
concerning the perceived certainty of punishment have been consistent 
and lead to the general conclusion that perceived certainty is inversely 
related to self-reported rule-violating behavior. Three "certainty" 
studies will be reviewed.
Jensen (1969) examined the relationship between certainty of 
punishment, deviant behavior, and attitudes toward the police. His sample
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consisted of approximately 1000 white males between grades 7 and 13. 
Students who straongly believed that offenders are very rarely caught 
and punished were almost four times as likely to engage in two or more 
deviant acts than respondents who strongly agreed that violators are 
almost always caught andpunished. Thirty seven per cent of those who 
felt that offenders are rarely caught and punished indicated respect 
for the law and police. On theother hand, of those who believed viola­
tors are almost always caught and punished, 72% indicated respect for 
the criminal justice system.
Waldo and Chiricos [1972) interviewed 321 unviersity students 
to determine relationships between marijuana use, theft and perceptions 
of the severity and certainty of punishment. The authors found that no 
relationship exists between the perceived severity of punishment and 
self-reported violations. However, "perceptions of the certainty of 
punishment appear most viable as a deterrent when they involve the 
potential criminal's estimate of his own chances for arrest and harsh 
penalties for a particular crime— independent of the chances for any 
"generalized other."
Burkett and Jensen [1975) questioned over a thousand predominantly 
white high school students in Seattle. Among other things, the investi­
gators were interested in the perceived certainty of apprehension as 
measured by responses to the following: "If I were to use marijuana, I
would probably get caught." Their data indicated that self-reported 
marijuana use "is inversely related to the belief that one's own use is 
likely to result in apprehension."
While research findings reveal a consistent, although sometimes
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weak, relationship between perceived certainty of punishment and self- 
reported violations, the evidence concerning perceived severity has been 
less than clear. Inverse relationships of any consequence between per­
ceived severity and self-reported violations have been rare and some 
researchers (Meier and Johnson, Silberman, 1976, Teevan, 1976), even 
have reported positive relationships. This is in the opposite direction 
predicted by deterrence theory. Of twelve studies reviewed by Grasmick 
and Bryjak (forthcoming 1980) that tested the perceived severity 
hypothesis, only one concluded that the perception of the severity of 
punishment is part of the social control process. These findings have 
led some researchers (Jensen et.a][. 1978, Teevan 1976, and Cohen 1978) 
to suggest that perceived severity of punishment should be dropped from 
the deterrence equation and attention focused almost exclusively on per­
ceived certainty of punishment. A good deal, if not all, of the confu­
sion and inconsistent findings concerning perceived severity of punish­
ment probably is related to the way this variable has been measured and 
tested. Grasmick and Bryjak argue that when properly measured and 
tested, perceived severity of punishment has a significant deterrent 
effect on rule-violating behavior. This point will be addressed in the 
methods chapter.
Moral Commitment, Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se 
Several studies have been concerned with the extent to which 
actors have been committed to norms and how normative commitment is 
related to self-reported deviance. Waldo and Chiricos (1972) discovered 
that when people are highly motivated, i.e., committed to a norm, "the 
threat of punishment has little if any deterrent effect. For example.
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91% of those who claimed never to have stolen anything (N=321) stated 
they would "not consider stealing" even if laws relating to theft were 
changed, i.e., reduced. These people conform to the law not because 
they are deterred by the threat of punishment but because they are com­
mitted to a normative standard. This notion of normative commitment as 
it relates to deviance leads to a distinction that must be made between 
crimes that are mala prhibita and those that are mala in se.
In the case of MALA IN SE the law supports the moral codes of 
society. If threats of legal punishment were removed, moral 
feelings and the fear of public judgment would remain as power­
ful crime prevention forces, at least for a limited period. In 
the case of MALA QUIA PROHIBITA, the law stands alone; confor­
mity is essentially a matter of effective legal sanctions 
(Andenaes in Waldo and Chiricos 1972: 524).
Waldo and Chiricos found that marijuana use is more likely than 
theft to be deterred by perceptions of high certainty of punishment.
The data revealed that only 25 percent of the respondents disagreed 
with the following: "possession of marijuana should be legalized for
adults." The law against marijuana use, because it is not supported by 
norms of the student subculture, is forced to "stand alone." If subcul­
tural norms do not deter marijuana use (MALA PROHIBITA), the deterrence 
effect must be the product of some other force, such as the law. For 
the crime of theft, however, the law has much more support in the mores. 
"Because of this, it may be difficult to separate the deterrent effect 
of the law from other aspects of deterrence."
Teevan (1976) found that the mala prohibita - mala in se distinc­
tion did not explain variations in deterrent effects as well as had been 
expected. Mala prohibita marijuana use is not deterred consistently more 
by threat of punishment than mala in se shoplifting. One possible
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explanation offered by Teevan is that respondents were never asked if 
they considered marijuana use and shoplifting mala prohibita and mala 
in se respectively. For example, some people may believe that shop­
lifting is mala prohibita, i.e., "it hurts no one," "stores should be 
ripped off," etc.
In 1976, Matthew Silberman administered questionnaires to 174 
undergraduate students at a private, eastern university. He attempted 
to evaluate the additive and interactive effects of several independent 
variables including moral commitment to legal norms, perceived severity 
and certainty of punishment and patterns of differential association on 
self-reported violations. Silberman found that people who are highly 
committed to norms underlying the law would conform even under a low 
perceived threat of legal punishment. The conformity of these people 
". . .is independent of threats of legal punishment or social disappro­
val." As Grasmick and McLaughlin (1978) have commented regarding Silber­
man' s work "the importance of this finding should not be overlooked. It 
reveals that the basic proposition of deterrence theory applies only 
to part of the population— those with low levels of internalization of 
the law.
Charles Tittle (1977) attempted to operationalize eight indepen­
dent variables as suggested by that same number of theories of deviance 
and conformity and to determine their". . . ability to predict indepen­
dently nine different kinds of self-estimated furture deviance." The 
independent variables were moral commitment, social integration, rela­
tive deprivation, alienation, differential association, legitimacy, util­
ity and sanction fear. He found that moral commitment has a mean
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association of 0.60 (second only to .75 for the perceived utility of the 
deviant behavior) with the nine self-reported indicators of estimated 
future deviance.
Informal Sanctions
Some researchers have taken a rather narrow focus on deterrence 
theory, limiting sanction threat to formal (i.e., legal) penalties. "If 
legal officials contribute little to social order, then the deterrence 
doctrine is an insignificant theory, for it recognizes no other agents 
of social control" (Gibbs 1977). Other sociologists have attempted to 
investigate the deterrent effects of informal sanctions and incorporate 
this variable into the deterrence equation.
Anderson, Chiricos and Waldo (1977) were concerned with informal 
sanctions and how they interact with formal sanctions in the deterrence 
process. In this study the authors consider, "the relative and cumula­
tive impact of perception of both formal and informal sanctions upon one 
type of deviant behavior among college students." They also present 
data in addressing the question of ". . . how perceived formal sanctions 
act as deterrents under various conditions of perceived informal sanctions 
for marijuana use." The authors found that both formal and informal 
sanctions are strongly and independently related to marijuana use 
(N=321 college students), with informal sanctions being slightly more of 
a deterrent. They also noted that the "cumulative impact of perceived 
certainty and perceived informal sanctions is greater than the separate 
impact of either certainty or the perceived informal sanctions alone."
Grasmick and Appleton (1977) were interested in how the threat of 
stigmatization from peers, contingent upon exposure as an offender.
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figures into the deterrence formula. To test this notion they offer an 
interaction model noting that, "Although this model never has been tested 
directly its implications have been used to interpret other findings."
A stratified random sample was drawn in a large Midwestern citv (N=166). 
Questions were asked concerning perceived threat of legal punishment, 
perceived threat of social disapproval contingent upon being exposed as 
an offender, and self-reported traffic violations. Grasmick and Appleton 
(1977: 24) found that "at least for speed law violations the combination
of a high perceived threat of legal punishment and a high perceived 
threat of social disapproval if disclosed as an offender is no greater 
a deterrent than the simple additive effects of the two variables. Both 
forms of threat have significant deterrent effects of about equal magni­
tude, and the two effects operate independently of one another."
Deterrence Research - An Overview 
Even a cursory review of the literature reveals that various 
research strategies have been utilized by investigators in an effort to 
examine the phenomenon of deterrence. Initially, capital punishment 
studies were the only empirical attempts made to test the general 
deterrent effects of formal sanctions. In the mid 60's researchers 
re-examined the early capital punishment studies and attempted to evaluate 
the possible deterrent effects of punishment on the remaining "index 
crimes." These aggregate-level studies revealed a consistent, although 
weak, inverse relationship between severity and certainty of punishment 
and crime rates. The limitations of aggregate-level studies along with 
a re-evaluation of the deterrence phenomenon, led investigators to the
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perceptual approach. The perceptual era saw the proliferation of both 
deterrence researchers and publications in this area. The basic conclu­
sion to be drawn from this initial phase of deterrence research is that 
sanction threats deter some people from engaging in specific types of 
rule-violating behavior. However, by itself this finding has rather 
limited utility. We still had little knowledge of the relation between 
punishment and other prohibitive factors in the social control process. 
Toward this end, other inhibitory factors were introduced. The two most 
important of these are moral commitment and informal sanctions. While 
these additional inhibitory variables were beginning to receive some 
attention, generative factors were still ignored. The only exception, 
as previously mentioned, was the work of Charles Tittle (1977).
It was argued that deterrence investigators have been quite 
selective in their adherence to and application of concepts drawn from 
the utilitarians. Bentham was concerned with rewards and pleasures as 
well as pain and punishment. While deterrence theory "usually begins 
with a model of man as a profit maximizer that is a calculator of profit 
from estimates of gain and cost resulting from this projected act" 
(Geerken and Gove, 1975), deterrence researchers have concentrated almost 
exclusively on cost or punishment and neglected anticipated rewards.
This preoccupation with negative sanctions has resulted in an almost 
total neglect of generative factors.
Results of existing deterrence research lead us to one general 
conclusion. People can be deterred to some extent from engaging in 
criminal and deviant behavior by the threat of punishment. The task now 
facing researchers is to discover the conditions under which sanction
Î  )
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threat is an effect deterrent. Perhaps the most important of these 
conditions are the factors that generate rule-violating behavior in the 
first place. Solving the puzzle concerning the overall effect of punish­
ment on rule-violating behavior cannot and will not be accomplished 
until generative factors have been considered.
CHAPTER IV 
DEVIANCE AND ANOMIE THEORY
The Theory in Perspective 
In the final section of Chapter One, the relationship between 
deterrence theory and social control was examined. We noted that since 
the work of Parsons (The Social System, 1951) the term social control 
has been primarily limited to the control of deviance. What constitutes 
deviance, however, and how it is related to social control is conceptua­
lized quite differently by various theorists. This becomes quite evident 
when we compare the perspectives of Clark and Gibbs (1965) , with that of 
Parsons. Parsons, it will be recalled, was especially interested in the 
actor's orientation. Deviant behavior was viewed as a motivated departure 
from internalized norms. Clark and Gibbs, on the other hand, have no 
interest whatsoever in the actor's disposition and orientation. These 
authors believe that sociologists have been preoccupied with the "sources 
of deviant behavior", to the extent that they have, for the most part, 
neglected reactions to deviant behavior. In their conceptualization of 
social control Clark and Gibbs (1965: 402) clearly distinguish between
sources of, or causes of deviant behavior and reaction to that behavior 
(social control). "We are not concerned with why the norms are what they 
are, or why persons commit deviant acts . . .  it is the focus on reaction
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to deviant behavior (i.e., behavior socially defined as deviant) that 
distinguishes the study of social control." While this rejection of 
the actor's orientation does have some advantages for a general concep­
tualization of social control, it also poses some formidable problems 
for deterrence theory.
An increasing number of studies in this current era of deter­
rence research indicate that the threat of punishment can deter people 
from engaging in rule-violating behavior. More specifically, it appears 
that some people may be deterred from commiting particular offenses in 
given situations. What we are only beginning to understand, however, is 
just what role the threat of punishment plays in inducing people to 
engage in nonrule-violating or conforming behavior. The inclusion of 
additional inhibitory variables to the basic deterrence equation has 
shed some light on this topic.. However, the social control picture 
will remain incomplete until the actor's orientation concerning genera­
tive factors, (i.e., what motivates him to deviance) are empirically 
and theoretically linked to the strategy of deterrence and other mecha­
nisms of control. It appears likely that the threat of punishment may 
function in a number of ways. Sanction threat may neutralize and there­
fore inhibit some types of deviant motivation, partially deter other 
types and be completely ineffective against still additional forms of 
motivation to deviate.
An example or two should suffice in illustrating this point. Con­
sider two hypothetical individuals neither of whom are motivated to com­
mit an illegal act. One believes that punishment would be certain and 
severe should he engage in the deviant behavior. The other does not.
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Neither commits the act because threats of punishment are irrelevant to 
people who are not motivated to criminal activity.
Two youths are motivated to break into a school arid engage in 
the destruction of property. Both youths perceive the punishment as cer­
tain and severe should they express their motivation in rule-violating 
behavior. One youth motivated by a search for pleasure, entertainment 
or "kicks" is deterred, while the other, motivated by revenge, hatred, 
getting back at those who have contributed to his humiiation is t̂ ê class­
room, is not.
The salience of the actor's orientation is certainly not new in 
the field of deviance, although it appears to be relatively foreign or 
unimportant to most deterrence researchers. It is time that deterrence 
theorists began examining etiological theories of crime and deviance with 
an eye to discovering how they are related to the threat of formal and 
informal sanctions. Only then will we have a more complete understand­
ing of both conforming and deviant behavior.
There is certainly no paucity of theories from which to choose 
since the bulk of work done by sociologists to date in the area of crime 
and deviance has focused on the study of the etiology of criminal and 
deviant behavior. Sociologists, it may be argued, have approached this 
problem from two perspectives--structure and process (Reid, 1979: 173).
The first views crime in relation to the social structure of society and 
seeks the connection between criminal and deviant behavior and the 
organization of the social system within which it exists. Social pro­
cess theories on the other hand, try to explain how individuals or groups 
of people become criminal. This perspective attempts to zero in on the
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very process by which individuals come to engage in deviant behavior 
as ooposed to the relationship between structure and crime.
These orientations, although analytically distinct, may be 
viewed as opposite sides of the same coin. The first perspective (struc­
tural) addresses the question of how much and what type of crime is 
generated by particular organizational and institutional configurations 
in a given society, while the second perspective (process) deals with 
the micro-level question of how people learn and actually engage in 
deviant and criminal activities.
Each of these perspectives has particular strengths and weak­
nesses. Pre-Parsonian functionalism and conflict theory offer structural 
explanations for the causes of crime and deviance at the system or class 
level while ignoring individual differences among actors and social 
psychological generative factors. Certainly the Chicago sociologists 
located the source of deviance within the structure of society, but 
downplayed individual differences which were still embedded in the 
"personal pathology" perspective.
Process theories explain how, and under what specific circum­
stances individuals come to engage in deviant behavior. Some consider 
the actor’s orientation to the situation, although they all neglect 
the relationship between social structure and crime. Labeling theorists 
see various institutions of control in society manufacturing deviance and 
usually focus on the actor’s changing definition of self and the situation 
as a result of his contact with these institutions. Parsons, more than 
anyone else, examines the social-psychological factors leading to 
deviant motivation (1951: 249-279). Sutherland (1939) not only dowrplayed
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structural variables but also rejected psychological factors and 
individual differences in his theory of differential association.^
One of the most far-reaching and empirically tested theories 
of deviance in sociology is the one presented by Robert Merton in 
"Social Structure and Anomie." Anomie theory is a rather unique 
sociological perspective in that it links a structural explanation 
for the genesis of deviant behavior with a series of individual 
adaptations or types of deviance resulting from the actor's felt 
strain.
Anomie, or strain theory as it is often called, will be the 
primary generative factor of interest in this paper. The remainder 
of this chapter will be devoted to: (1) an explication of anomie
theory, and (2') a selective review of the empirical studies concern­
ing anomie and deviance, and (3) the relationship between anomie and 
deterrence theory.
The Theory of Anomie 
Emile Durkheim, the eminent French sociologist, first used 
the term anomie in his "The Division of Labor" pulished in 1893.
Anomie was only a minor component in his treatment of the division
7
The original theory contained not nine but seven statements. The 
final one (seventh) stating, "Social disorganization is the basic cause 
of systematic criminal behavior." This was a more structural explanation 
for the genesis of criminal behavior. The influence of the Chicago School 
is obvious. Sutherland was later to reject this concept and also exclude 
it from differential association. He substituted the term "social organi­
zation" and saw crime as an expression of that organization. "Most com­
munities are organized both for crime and anticriminal behavior, and in 
that sense the crime rate is an expression of the differential group 
organization." With this revision, Sutherland eliminated the disorgani­
zation approach that linked criminal activity almost exclusively with 
lower class neighborhoods.
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of labor and was used primarily as a descriptive term for one of the 
abnormal forms of organic solidarity (Clindard, 1964: 4). Anomie was
also an important aspect of Durkheim's explanation of suicide.
Anomie literally means "normlessness," It exists in society when 
there is a breakdown or disruption of the norms regulating people's lives. 
Durkheim believed that mens aspirations unlike those of animals whose 
"equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity", must be held in 
check and not allowed to rise beyond their capability of fulfillment.
When men's appetites "have become freed of any limiting authority" we 
may speak of an anomic society. It is important to note that anomie is 
a social and not a psychological phenomenon. It refers to a characteris­
tic of social systems and not of psychological systems.
It refers to a breakdown of social standards governing behavior 
and also signifies little social cohesion. IVhen a high degree of 
anomie has set in, the rules once governing conduct have lost their 
savor and force. Above all else they are deprived of ligitimacy.
They do not comprise a social order in which men can confidently 
put their trust (Merton, 1964: 226).
Although Durkheim utilized the concept of anomie in his theory 
of suicide, he did not relate it to a general theory of deviance. This 
was to be done in 1937 by Robert K, Merton in his now famous paper 
"Social Structure and Anomie." This statement by Merton is important for 
at least two reasons: (1) it offered a sociological explanation for
deviance when a number of psychological (especially Freudian) and biologi­
cal theories were popular and generally accepted, and (2) to a large 
extent it removed deviant behavior from the category of abnormality.
Merton was to argue basically that the same forces in society that produce 
conformity also produce deviance. In this paper he set out to explain 
" . . .  how some social structures exert a definite pressure upon persons
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in the society to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming conduct."
There are two sources of strain in societies of the American 
type that lead to deviance. The first is the overarching emphasis on 
goals. Merton focuses on goals of success and achievement, especially 
those of a pecuniary nature. According to Merton, this pressure to 
succeed is felt at all class levels. The ubiquitous goal to succeed and 
continually achieve is a fundamental component of our value system and 
as such is an integral factor in the socialization process. This 
aspect of Merton's argument is routinely overlooked by many sociologists 
in their interpretation of anomie theory (Hilbert and Wright, 1979).
The second strain toward anomie resulting in deviance is a product 
of the disjunction between culturally prescribed goals and means. For 
Merton, however, anomie " . . .  does not operate evenly throughout society." 
Its greatest impact will be in the lower classes where means in the form
of a legitimate opportunity structure are either unavailable or insuffi­
cient, The frustrations resulting from structures which limit or block
opportunity now manifest themselves in deviant behavior. This is not to
say that deviance is to be found only in the lower classes. Nor does it 
mean that specific adaptations are only located in a particular class.
What it does mean is that deviance in general is more likely to be found
in one class (lower) than in others.
In the years following its publication, Merton's theory of anomie
g
was to be modified and extended by numerous authors, A good deal of 
anomie theory has been focused on delinquent behavior. The two most 
notable theroies in this area are those of Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin.
g
As of 1964 Clinard lists Dubin and Parsons as well as Cohen, and
Cloward and Ohlin as major contributors to anomie theory.
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Although Albert Cohen (1955) in Delinquent Boys rejects the appli­
cability of "illicit means theory" to explain the phenomenon he has des­
cribed (lower class male delinquency) the link to anomie theory appears
9
quite evident. For Cohen, lower-class youths cannot measure up to 
middle-class standards by which they are evaluated. It is not that lower- 
class boys do not want to be successful as indicated by the "middle class 
measuring rod", but because of inadequate socialization by middle class 
standards, they cannot. As a result of their inability to measure up 
to this standard, lower-class youths face a problem of adjustment for 
which the deviant subculture is an attractive solution.
In 1960 Cloward and Ohlin published Delinquency and Opportunity, 
a work that linied anomie theory with Sutherland's theory of differential 
association. Like Merton, Cloward and Ohlin examined the disjuncture 
between culturally approved goals and means arguing that lower-class 
youth are denied access to legitimate opportunity structures in their 
attempt to reach approved goals, However, it is not simply a matter of 
substituting illegitimate alternatives if the latter are not available. 
Within a given society some youths may have access to certain illegitimate 
opportunities while other youths do not. In neighborhoods where there is 
no stable pattern of criminality, the disorganized slum, youths are likely 
to form conflict (engaging in violence) or retreatist (often drug-related) 
subcultures.
^In commenting on the "illicit means" aspect of Merton's anomie 
theory Cohen states, "This argument is sociologically sophisticated and 
highly plausible as an explanation for adult professional crime and for 
the property delinquency of some older and some professional juvenile 
theories. Unfortunately, it fails to account for the non-utilitarian 
quality of the subcultures we have described."
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Anomie and Anomia 
The concept of anomie as used by Merton is a sociological term 
and as such is a property of social systems. There is, however, a sub­
jective component to this phenomenon. In 1956 Leo Srole created a five 
item scale designed "to measure anomie as subjectively experienced"
(Merton 1964: 219). Srole called this subjective aspect of anomie,
anomia. It refers to the individual’s perception of his social environ­
ment and his place within that environment. Merton believed Sroles 
anomia scale was a step in the right direction, "if the concept of anomie 
is to be utilized in empircal research",
It is imperative to an accurate understanding of anomie that the 
relationship between anomie and anomia be examined and comprehended. For 
as Merton (1964:227) notes the distinction between these two terms is 
much more than a "terminological debate . . ."It cuts deep into basic 
problems of extending the theory of anomie and intitiating a new phase 
in empirical research on anomie."
Although we would expect a significant number of people to experi­
ence the subjective component of anomie or anomia in a society character­
ized by anomie, anomie need not be present for anomia to occur. In other 
words, an anomic society is a sufficient, although not a necessary, condi­
tion for the occurrence of anomia. As Hyman (1953:427) has stated, "if 
the individual regarded his chances to achieve his goals of success as 
negligible, when in reality they were good, there would be a psychologi­
cally produced strain towards anomie". And conversely we might add that 
if an individual perceived his chances of success as good when in reality 
they were bad, there would be little, if any, strain toward anomie. The 
most critical aspect of anomie research then is the investigation of the
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actor's perception of the means available to him in his attempt to secure 
internalized goals.
This is not to say, however, that the objective existence of 
anomie is inconsequential or irrelevant to the prevalence of anomia. As 
previously mentioned, we would expect to find high rates of anomia in 
a society characterized as anomic. But it must be stressed that an 
anomic society or social group is of consequence only to the extent that 
it affects people's lives, producing psychological strains that result 
in deviant behavior, We should like to take this point even one step 
further and argue that anomie devoid of anomia is not a useful concept 
in the area of deviance. Individuals, not societies, commit deviant 
acts and individuals experience anomia - not anomie.
Predicated on this line of easoning, it is my contention that
anomie research should focus primarily (although not exclusively) on the
actor's perception of personal goals and his perception of opportunities
and/or his present position vis-à-vis realization of these goals. Not
only is anomia the link between a structural condition (anomie) and the
manifestations of that condition at the individual level (deviant behavior),
but, as Merton (1964:228-229) clearly states, anomia also can be used as
an index of anomie.
It seems not to have been widely recognized again, if we are to 
judge from the appended inventory of research on the subject—  
that by adopting well-known procedures of analysis, the measures 
of anomia for the individual can be adapted to serve as a measure
of anomie for the social system.
Following now well-developed practices, measures of anomie for 
individuals in a particular social unit (neighborhood, clubs, 
gangs, formal organization, and the like) can of course be
aggregated to find out the rate or proportion having a desig­
nated degree of anomia. This aggregated figure would then 
constitute an index of anomie for the given social unit.
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In "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction" (Clinard 1964:229- 
239) Merton outlines a three phase research design where he utilizes 
just such a strategy, using "aggregated measures of anomia as indexes of 
anomie". Not only is a research focus on anomia more in keeping with 
Merton’s view concerning the testing of his theory, but also, it poses 
fewer methodological problems,
A Critical Review of Anomie Literature 
The theory of anomie has generated a substantial amount of re­
search. As of 1964 Cole and Zuckerman (Clinard 1964) list no less than 
88 empirical works and 101 theoretical studies in the area of anomie.
Only a limited number of these empircal studies, however, are related to 
deviant behavior. Of these, most are in the area of delinquent behavior 
with a lesser number concerned with adult crime and mental illness.
One of the earliest anomie studies was conducted by Wood in 1942. 
Analyzing court records and census data from seven small Wisconsin communi­
ties he found that crime rates are a function of the lack of access to 
legitimate means within local opportunity structures. "The factor related 
to their variations (crime rates) are not those of foreign birth or 
church attendance but the ability to become successful in economic, poli­
tical and non-religious group participation."
In 1959, Meir and Bell interviewed 701 adult males in the San 
Francisco area to examine the relationship between anomie and access to 
means for the achievement of life goals. They found that ability to 
achieve goals is inversely related to feelings of anomia. They also sug­
gest that anomia is not limited to inhabitants of large urban centers but 
may also be found in rural areas as well.
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Tuckman and Kliener (1962) examined the relationship between aspira­
tion, achievement and schizophrenia in 1300 male first-admissions to a 
Philadelphia mental hospital. Controlling for race and religious mem­
berships, they found that, " . . .  schizophrenia increased as the dis­
crepancy between achievement and aspiration increased."
A number of anomie studies will be briefly but critically reviewed. 
We will concentrate on the researchers operationalization and measurement 
of key terms in anomie theory, namely, goals and the means of achieving 
these goals. It will be argued that one or more of the following short­
comings is to be found in all but one of these studies.
1. Success goals are treated as both uniform and pervasive.
Common success goals are viewed as being shared by all Americans 
regardless of class or position. The actor's success goals, 
however, should be ascertained and not assumed to be "uniform 
and pervasive". Although there is some evidence to support the 
common success goal position (Pettigrew 1964, Sherif and Sherif 
1964), there is certainly no lack of research that resulted in 
contradictory findings. Sewell et (1957) and Haller et al, 
(1976) provide strong arguments based on extensive research that 
the level of occupational aspirations (certainly a key component 
of success goals) of "lower SES youth is systematically lower 
than that of higher SES youth regardless of sex or grade"
(Haller 1974:119-120),
2, Success goals have been measured at a very vague and general 
level. Instead of zeroing in on specific goals and aspirations 
of individuals, some researchers have been satisfied to use "suc­
cess" as an inclusive catch-all category. Specific success goals
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should be determined. Not only does some general meaning of 
"success" vary from individual to individual, but also it is 
doubtful that people orient their lives toward this overall goal 
in anything but an indirect way. People plan their activities 
around numerous smaller goals that collectively make up some 
distant more inclusive aspiration. For example, an adolescent 
might state that being successful in life is very important to 
him. Being successful means becoming a physician. To be a 
physician one must gain admission to a medical school which 
means being successful at the undergraduate level or, getting 
good grades. Eventual long range success is accomplished by the 
achievement of numerous smaller intervening goals. I would 
argue that while a long range goal (become a physician) may always 
be uppermost in a person's mind, everyday activities are oriented 
towards the achievement of short range goals.
3. Both goals and means are measured from the persepctive of 
some general other, for example, "people like yourself", or 
"most people", as opposed to the actor's perception of his 
own goals and means. The importance of goals and access to 
means should be measured from the individual, as opposed to 
"general other" point of view, We are concerned with the 
individual's "definition of the situation" as it relates to 
his perception of success goals and life chances, Learning what 
an individual thinks the importance of being successful is to 
others tells us nothing of how his perception of the importance of 
personal goals will influence his behavior.
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In 1959 Reiss and Rhodes attempted to answer a number of ques­
tions concerning the realtionship between deviant behavior and educational 
goals among adolescents. The authors, as shown in Table 1, used a very 
broad definition of education as a goal and measured respondent's inter­
nalization of their aspiration from the persepctive of some general other, 
"most people ought to go to college or finish high school or " The
means, or opportunity to achieve these goals, was considered to be a func­
tion of the respondent's "group position" as determined by a constella­
tion of variables. In other words, it was not the respondent's perception 
of his/her ability to achieve desired goals that was used to measure 
opportunity but rather the respondent's psoition in a group as determined 
by the researchers. This was done primarily on the basis of ascribed 
characteristics (race, sex, socioeconomic status, and age). Simply stated, 
Reiss and Rhodes measured a success goal (general education) from the 
perspective of some "general other" and viewed the means available to 
achieve this goal as a function of one's position in the class structure 
of American society.
Elliot (1962) focused his research on two related questons: (1) Do
delinquent boys define success in terms similar to those used by non­
deliquent bosy?, and (2) Do delinquent boys perceive less opportunity to 
achieve their success goals than non-delinquents? Although his measures 
of success goals were quite specific (graduate form junior high school, 
high school, two year college, etc.), the questions were not posed in 
terms of the individual's perception of his/her own goals but rather in 
terms of illiciting a general opinion. The goals question (Table 1) 
read as follows, "How far in school do you think a person ought to go to 
be successful . . .?" The problem from our perspective is that success
TABLE 1 - OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF GOALS AND MEANS AND SAMPLE ITEMS FROM VARIOUS ANOMIE STUDIES
Author and Year
Operationalization and Measurement 
of "Goals"
Operationalization and Measurement of 
"Means"
Reiss and Rhodes 
1959
Goal - General Education from the 
perspective of some general other 
"most people ought to go to college 
or finish High School, or go to 
High School until 16 years old, or 
finish Grade School or get some 
schooling"
Means - "The adolescents group position 
in society as represented by his Race, 
Sex, I.Q., Socioeconomic status and Age"
D. S. Elliot 
1962
Goals - Education and Occupation 
from the perspective of some 
general other "some people say 
that school and education are very 
important for success in later life, 
how far in school do you think a 
person ought to go to be success­
ful, circle the school that you 
think is most important to success" 
Graduation from:
8th grade
Junior High School 
Etc.
Means - Perceived individual mobility 
respondents were asked, "How far they 
thought they would go in school."
Landis Et. Al. 
1963
Goals - General values from the 
perspective of some general other 
Value Orientation Items
Means - Respondents perception of his 
opportunity (not linked to goals) 
Awareness of Limited Access to Oppor­
1. People should only keep pro­
mises when it is to their 
benefit.
2. Good manners are for sisses.
3. The law is always against the 
ordinary guy.
tunity items
1. I probably won't be able to do the 
kind of work I want to do because 
I won't have enough education.
2. A guy like me has a pretty good 
chance of going to College.
3. Most people are better off than I am.
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goals, as defined for some nebulous, vague, general population and the 
individual's perception of his own goals, are obviously two different 
and most probably different things,
Elliot's measure of opportunity tapped the respondent's percep­
tion of his/her own chance of success. However, the opportunity indicator 
is more suited to tapping educational aspirations than means to goals. 
Asking respondents, "How far they thought they would go in school", 
appears to be indicative of the extent to which they value education. An 
indicator of the perceived opportunity structure would have more aptly 
been phrased, "How far will you be able to go in school? How far 
could you go in school if you wanted to?", or something to this effect. 
Even with this deficiency, Elliot's work can be seen as an improvement 
over the Reiss and Rhodes research in that the operationalization and 
measurement of means to goals was brought into the subjective, perceptual 
realm and not limited to the individual's position in the class structure.
Using a sample of 1,000 sixth and seventh grade youths, Landis 
e^ al̂  (1963), attempted to test the rejection of middle class values and 
awareness of limited opportunity thesis of Cohen and of Cloward and Ohlin. 
The general value statements relating to goals (Table I) were presented 
from the perception of some general other. For example, "People should 
only keep promises when it is to their benefit". The "general other" 
type of question used in many of these studies has the critical shortcom­
ing of failing to ascertain how the goal being considered is perceived 
by the respondent as it relates to his/her personal aspirations.
The "awareness of access to opportunity items", on the other hand, 
were measured from the individual's perception of his/her own chance of 
success. The Landis et al study was somewhat peculiar in that the authors
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did not attempt to measure goals and means that were linked, educational 
goals and access to schools, for example. Instead, the authors attempted 
to measure numerous "value orientations" from the perspective of some 
general other and an array of opportunity items as they relate to the 
individual respondent.
Mizruchi (1964) attempted to put Merton's theory of anomie to an 
empirical test. However, before the theory could be tested, one of its 
primary assumptions had to be validated, i.e., "what is the distribution 
of success goals among the social "classes?" Mizruchi asked respondents 
in upstate New York how important it was for them personally to get 
ahead in life (Table 2). Respondents were asked to list, in order of 
importance, those things which they believed to be signs of success in 
American society. The five item list was comprised of education, money, 
many friends, home ownership, and job security. In utilizing this 
strategy, Mizruchi allowed respondents to rank a number of success 
goals as opposed to determining how important a particular goal was to 
an individual. This technique permits the researcher to ascertain the 
relative importance of success goals as they are related to other goals 
in a network of aspirations,
Opportunity questions were asked from the perspective of some 
hypothetical, supposedly average person and the individual's perception 
of his/her own chances of goal attainment, Mizruchi also attempted to 
leam if people felt that they had capitolized on opportunities that 
were available to them. Respondents were asked, "Have you felt that some­
how you have allowed opportunities for success to slip through your 
fingers?" This item adds a rather interesting and somewhat ingenious 
twist to anomie theory. A goals-means disjuncture may exist, but not
TABLE 2 - OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF GOALS AND MEANS AND SAMPLE ITEMS FRm VARIOUS ANOMIE
STUDIES
Author and Year Operationalization and Measurement 
of "Goals"
Operationalization and Measurement 
of "Means"
E. H. Mizruchi 
1964
Goals - General goal as it relates 
to the respondent "How important to 
you personally is it to get ahead 
in life?" "Could you list in or­
der of importance those things 
which you believe to be signs of 
success in our society? Education, 
prestiege, money, many friends, 
and job security.
Means - Perceived opportunity from posi­
tion of general other and respondents 
own position "Do you feel that a person 
with ability has a good chance of achiev­
ing success in our society or do you 
feel that ability has little to do with 
it?" "Have you felt that somehow you 
have allowed opportunities for success 
to slip through your fingers?"
A. L. Rhodes 
1964
Goals - Respondents occupational 
aspiration. Survey items not in­
cluded in paper.
Means - Objective opportunity considered 
a function of respondents class, sex, 
and parents occupation.
R. J. Jessor 
Et. Al. 1968
Goals - General not measured.
Goals were assumed to be uniform 
and pervasive in American Society.
Means - Objective opportunity considered 
a function of the respondents position 
in the American class structure.
Elliot and Voss 
1974
Goals - Respondents educational 
and occupational aspirations. "If 
you could have any job you wanted, 
what job would you like to have as 
an adult?" Describe
Means - Respondents perception of his 
chances of attaining educational and 
occupational goals. "What do you think 




because the means were perceived to be unavailable, but rather, because 
an opportunity to succeed was overlooked or squandered. An innovative 
researcher, Mizruchi measured the rank importance of goals as they are 
perceived by and relate to the individual respondent as well as the 
means at both the individual and general level.
Rhodes (1964) conducted a study to explore the relationship 
between occupational aspiration, occupational level (partents) and anomia. 
Questionnaires were administered to high school seniors in one of the 
smaller SMSA's in Tennessee and one small rural town. Rhodes asked 
students (none of the survey items used is provided by the author) if 
they aspired to professional occupations, other white collar occupations, 
or blue collar jobs. Class position, the opportunity indicator, was 
considered to be a function of parrents' occupation ("white collar,"
"blue collar," or "farm"), community of residence (rural or urban), and 
sex. This study has some of the same shortcomings as the Reiss and 
Rhodes (1959) research. Success goals are measured and categorized at 
a very general level. A clerk in a shoe store and a laboratory technician 
may both have been classified as "white collar" occupations but represent 
very different levels of occupational aspiration. The clerk's position 
would probably require a high school diplomoa or less, while the laboratory 
technician position might require four years of college or more. Since an 
objective measure of opportunity was used (class position), it is not 
possible to know how respondents perceived their chances of aspiring to 
previously stated occupational goals.
Jessor et a^ (1968) conducted a study of deviant behavior in a 
tri-enthnic (Anglo-Spanish-Idian N=221) city in Colorado. Unlike other 
researchers who attempted to measure goals and means and the disjuncture
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between them, Jessor and his associates considered goals to be a constant,
i.e., they accepted Merton's assumption that cultural goals are uniform
and pervasive throughout American society.
"The pervasive dissemination of core success values and the 
broadly shared understanding of the tangible criteria of success 
are difficult to overestimate in light of the widespread diffu­
sion of contemporary mass media. That the burden of these 
values has reached into the farthest comers of American society 
is readily documented," (Jessor 5̂  1968:56)
Like Reiss (1959) and Reiss and Rhodes (1964), these researchers
also assumed that one's position in the class structure determines access
to legitimate means,
The fundamental point is that in American society there is a 
differential distribution of legitimate resources or channels 
of access to the goals pervasively stressed by the American 
culture. The topography of access and, therefore, the topo­
graphy of value-access disjunctions closely parallels the 
hierarchy of socioeconomic status and membership in minority 
ethnic or racial groups. This means that value-access 
disjunctions will be concentrated in the lower social strata 
and that this socially structured source of pressure for 
deviance will consequently be concentrated there. (Jessor 
et ^  1968:58)
If "pressure toward deviance" is greatest in the "lower social 
strata", it is necessary to determine an individual's rule violating 
behavior and his position in the class system. Toward this end the 
researchers constructed two indexes applicable to individuals: "an index
of Socioeconomic Status (SES) and an index of Objective Access (OA) in 
the opportunity structure", The SES index was based on education, job 
type, income, and neighborhood of residence. The OA index consisted 
of eight dichotomous variables (Table 2), age, age plus marital status, 
language spoken in present home, occupation, education, between 
generation mobility, religion, and social participation. Respondents 
received scores of either 0 or 1, depending on their characteristics as
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they related to each of the eight dichotomous variables. For example, if 
the language spoken in the home was English, the respondent received a 
score of 1, any other language received a score of zero; if one's occupa­
tion was "semi-skilled or higher," a zero was received. "The final 
scale consisted of eight dichotomous variables, yielding OA scores run­
ning from 0, no favorable attributes, to 8, all favorable access attri­
butes" [Jessor 1968:236). No attempt was made to tap the respon­
dent's perception of his position in the class structure or his perception 
about the opportunities or lack of opportunities available to him.
Jessor's et al work is certainly a unique approach to anomie 
theory. Merton's basic assumptions [uniform pervasive cultural goals, and 
a limited opportunity structure available to lower classes) are readily 
accepted, Self-reported deviance is then accounted for within this 
framework. In light of this approach, it is not surprising that the 
authors' findings are consistent with the anomie perspective.
In a 1974 study, Elliot and Voss examined the relationship between 
delinquency, dropout and a series of independent variables including 
anomie. Considering their work a "modification and elaboration of Cloward 
and Ohlin's" thesis, their model utilized the following independent 
variables: [1) aspiration and opportunity disjuncture, [2) internal-
external attributes of blame, [3) alienation, and (4) access and exposure 
to delinquent groups. Unlike Cloward and Ohlin, the authors attempts 
to explain delinquency and dropout in all social classes [N=2600).
Elliot and Voss identified three sets of goals relating to the community, 
school, and home, They attempted to measure the success goals held by 
students and the students' perception of their future success or failure 
in attaining these goals.
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Educational and occupational aspirations [Table 2) were measured 
as they related to the respondent. The occupational question asked, was
as follows "If you could have any job you wanted, what job would you like
to have as an adult?" Similarly, respondents were asked if they believed 
they would believed they would ever get that job, "What do you think are 
your chances of ever getting that kind of job?"
The work by Elliot and Voss is a departure from and improvement 
over previous anomie research in at least three ways: (1) specific goals 
and means are measured as they relate to the respondent, (2) "the 
goals-means disjuncture was modified to be logically independent of 
class", and (3) both goals and means are considered valuables.
By way of a brief summary we can see that with the exception of
the Elliot and Voss research, the studies just reviewed have one or
more of the following shortcomings,
1. Success goals were treated as both uniform and per­
vasive shared by Americans in all strata of society.
2. Success goals were measured at a vague and general level.
3. Both goals and means were measured from the perspective 
of some general other.
A New Measure of Anomia
Sroles (1956) five item scale was the first attempt to develop an
empircal indicator of anomia. As Srole clearly acknowledged, this pio­
neering work was not to be considered the final word on anomia. However,
as Merton was to point out eight years later, "no more exacting measure 
of anomia has since been developed and systematically employed." The 
five items comprising the scale are listed below.
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1. There is little use writing to public officials because 
they often aren’t really interested in the problem of the 
average man.
2. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let
tomorrow take care of itself.
3. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average
man is getting worse, not better.
4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world with 
the way things look for the future.
5. These days a person really doesn’t know who he can count 
on.
Meir and Bell (1959) criticized Sroles scale arguing that it 
was primarily a measure of despair, hopelessness and resentment and as 
such resembled Merton’s retreatist adaptation.
We are convinced that the questions for the most measure 
despair, that is utter helplessness and discouragement. A 
person agreeing strongly with each of these questons is beyond 
simple apathy, he is in a condition of sadness and distress in 
which he is unable to exercise any confidence or trust that his 
desires or wishes may be realized and in the extreme may reach 
the point described by Maclver as "unquiet inrospection and 
self torture".
I agree with Meir and Bells criticism and argue that Sroles 
scale is not an appropriate indicator of anomie as "subjectively experi­
enced" -- i.e., the compliment of Merton’s anomie (an objective condition 
of group life). If anomie is the disjucture between culturally prescribed 
goals and means, then anomia should be the difference between the actor’s 
goals and the perception of his present position relative to the realiza­
tion of these goals.
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Also, whenever possible, the intensity of commitment to goals 
should be measured. Merton (1968:225) makes this point in his review of 
Hyman's (1953) work.
As it happens, the survey data available to Hyman do not 
discriminate between the degrees of commitment to the goal but 
indicate only the relative frequency with which individuals in 
the samples drawn from the several social strata express some 
unknow degree of acceptance of the success-goal and of related 
values. From the outset, then, it appears that subsequent 
inquiry might be usefully directed toward studying the inten­
sity as well as the extent to which these values are held 
in diverse groups, social strata, and communities.
The following questions, used in this research, are indicative
of the type of items I contend are more in line with Merton's anomie "as
subjectively experienced" and, are therefore, superior to Sroles scale.
College students are often concerned with getting "good grades" at school. 
I would like to know how important getting good grades are to you.
The scale below ranges from 0 to 100. A score of 100 would indicate that 
getting good grades is the most important thing in your life these days 
while a score of 0 would mean that getting good grades is not the least 
bit important to you. Your answer concerning the importance of getting 
good grades may take any value (be any number) between 0 and 100.
At the appropriate place on the scale below write and circle the number 
that indicates how important getting good grades is to you.
 100 Getting good grades is the most important
thing in my life these days.
50 I am concerned with getting good grades but
no more so than I am with a lot of other things.
  0 Getting good grades is not the least bit im­
portant to me.
THIS IS A PROBABILITY QUESTION
Think for a moment about all the factors that go into getting grades on a 
test. There are, of course, numerous factors to be considered: your
intelligence; how interested you are in the subject matter; the amount of 
time you have to study for a course given other demands in your life; the 
circumstances under which you study the difficulty of the tests; whether 
or not you get nervous taking tests, etc. Taking all of these factors
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into account, what would you estimate is the average probability of get­
ting the grade you want on an exmaination at the university?
An answer of 0% would mean that on the typical test you take there is no 
chance of getting the grades you want while an answer of 100% would mean 
you are absolutely sure that you will get the grade you want.
Consider all the tests you take. Out of all these tests, for what per
cent do you get the grade you want? _________ %
You hear and read a lot these days about "life styles," that is, the
various ways different people choose to lead their lives. Important 
aspects of a life style include the ability to do the things that you 
enjoy (travel, eat out, etc.) and have the material possessions (an 
automobile, clothes, sporting equipment, etc.) that you would like.
About how much money would it take to lead the life style that you think
is appropriate for you at this stage of your life? If you are married 
consider the amount necessary for your family as well.
On the average, not counting major expenditures like tuition, it would 
take about $_________a month to lead the type of life I think is appro­
priate at this stage of my life.
In the previous question you stated how much money it would take to lead 
a life style you considered appropriate foryou at this stage of your 
life. Now I would like to know approximately how much money you actually 
receive on a monthly basis from all your sources of income (parents, 
job, GI bill, scholarships, etc.)
In a typical month at this time of my life I can count on approximately 
$ .
In the first item respondents determine the extent to which good 
grades are important to them. It is not assumed that because one is a 
college student: (1) getting good grades automatically becomes a suc­
cess goal and (2) this goal is held at the same level of importance by all 
students. The second item taps the respondent's past accomplishments as 
they relate to the goal of getting good grades. Anomia is the difference 
or disjunction between success goals (getting good grades) and means (the 
ability to achieve the desire goal).
The third item is a measure of the amount of money that is nec­
essary to live the type of life the respondent believes is appropriate
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for him/her at the present time. The final question is a measure of the 
respondents average actual monthly income. Anomia is the difference 
between the desired monetary goal and actual monthly income.
CHAPTER V
HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
A Recapitulation 
We have seen that positivism brought to criminology via Lombroso 
and the Italian School, was to have a significant impact on the conceptu­
alization and study of criminal behavior. Lombroso's application of the 
scientific method to the study of crime had considerable influence on 
sociologists who "transformed his biological determinism." (Cressey 1979) 
The significance of this scientific revolution for the study of 
human behavior in general and criminal behavior in particular cannot be 
overestimated. It represented a radical view of the world and a search 
for natural causes in studying individuals and societies. Man himself 
was now viewed in a very different manner.
As a result of the monumental work by Darwin, man was considered 
an animal (albeit the most advanced or highly evolved animal) and as such 
had no special providence with God. Much like any other animal, man was 
subject to the laws and limitations of his biological makeup and/or was 
considered a product of his social environment. His "connection" to the 
almighty was severed and replaced with a biological and social "link" to 
the natural world. Man was no longer viewed as a product of a special 
creation endowed with, among other things, free will. In the field of 
criminology this represented an alternative, an alternative that was
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incompatible with the world view of the classicists. If man's behavior 
was not the result of his own volition but was caused to a greater or 
lesser degree by factors outside of his control, then he was not full 
responsible for his actions.
The belief that criminal behavior was determined seriously 
undermined the utility of punishment as an effective mechanism of social 
control. The notion of punishment as a deterrent makes sense only within 
a larger philosophical framework anchored on a foundation of free will and 
individual responsibility. The concept of punishment, generally associated 
with classical criminology, would be replaced by positivists with another 
response to criminal behavior-treatment. The treatment varies according 
to theoretical perspective and level of analysis. Biological and psycho­
analytic theories are at the individual level and call for manipulation 
of the psyche [therapy) and in some cases alteration of the central 
nervous system (shock treatment, chemotherapy, etc.). Sociological 
explanations of criminal behavior and subsequent treatment of that 
behavior are at the group level (ranging from changing peer groups to 
community reorganization) and the macro level (changing the larger 
economic system from capitalism to socialism for example).
In the past 70 years, criminology in the United States has been 
dominated by the sociological perspective. Within the last ten to fifteen 
years some of the ideas of Bentham, Beccaria and the classical school have 
been resurrected by sociologists who have come to be known as deterrence 
theorists. These researchers are interested in the extent to which formal 
and informal sanctions act as a general deterrent.
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The basic issues reaised by deterrence theorists are formidable 
ones. The primary question concerns the relation between force and human 
behavior. Specifically, to what extent is force threat an effective 
mechanism in controlling human behavior? This is a question of impor­
tance not only for criminology (force threat in the form of legal sanc­
tions) but, as Goode (1972) has noted, for sociology in general. The 
other significant question, implicit in the issue of force threat and 
human beahvior, concerns the relation between the deterrence view of man 
grounded in classical criminology and the determinist view of man 
anchored in positivist criminology.
Concerning the first question, it appears obvious that force and 
force threat have been significant factors in the attempt to control 
human behavior. Even a cursory review of history reveals that the threat 
and implementation of punishment has been used as a mechanism of social 
control in countless societies. What is not so obvious, however, is 
how effective (both in the long and short run) a method of control the 
use of force and force threat has been. We are only beginning to under­
stand that some types of behavior in which certain groups of people 
engage, under specific conditions in particular situations may be suc­
cessfully controlled by the threat of punishement.
The second question (some may argue that this is really the pri­
mary issue) concerns the present relationship between a classical and 
positivist criminology. Although deterrence theorists are not classical 
criminologists to the extent that Beccerea was (deterrence researchers do 
embrace the tenets of the scientific method), their doctrine is neverthe­
less embedded in the "FREE will" perspective. The question then becomes 
to what extent can this "FREE will" approach be integrated into a
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deterministic, positivistic criminology? This issue, to my knowledge, 
has not been addressed by any contemporary deterrence theorist.
While deterrence researchers have expended a great deal of 
energy examining various combinations of inhibitory variables, they 
have neglected to consider the generative factors associated with rule 
violating behavior. This may be the result of (1) a selective inter­
pretation of utilitarian thought, (2) a strategy that dictates an 
understanding of inhibitory factors before generative factors are con­
sidered or (3) a rejection of causal explanation of rule violating 
behavior and a complete acceptance of the free will position.
For whatever reason generative factors have been neglected in 
the past, it is imperative to a more complete understanding of 
conforming-rule violating behavior that they be considered in the 
future. In a recent paper Grasmick and Green (1979) reported that 
40 per cent of the variance in rule violating behavior was explained by 
an additive deterrence model containing three inhibitory variables.
The unexplained 60 per cent of the variance they suspect, "is due to 
variation in levels of motivation to violate the law among respondents 
in our sample." While inhibitory variables are important components of 
an explanation of conforming-rule violating behavior, by themselves, they 
are insufficient just as by themselves generative factors appear to be 
insufficient.
Hypotheses to be Tested
The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are derived from the 
model of rule violating behavior that has been developed and discussed
87
in previous chapters. The model posits that the certainty and severity 
of punishement and moral commitment (inhibitory variables) will have a 
greater effect on behavior under conditions of high anomia. In the 
absence of this generative factor (anomia) people will refrain from rule 
violating behavior even if they score low on measures of perceived 
certainty and severity of punishment and moral commitment. Punishment 
will act as a deterrent only in those cases where individuals are 
motivated to deviate. When anomia is low the threat of punishment will 
have little effect on behavior.
The hypotheses were composed of three sets of variables. These 
included the generative factor of interest, anomia and inhibitory varia­
bles— the certainty and severity of both formal and informal punishment-- 
and the dependent variables, self-reported violations. Two violations 
were considered: theft of an item worth "a few dollars" and cheating
on university examinations.
Hypothesis 1.: The higher the anomia score the higher the inci­
dence of self reported violation.
This hypothesis was formulated to test the relationship between 
the actors perception of a goals— menas disjuncture and self reported 
violations. It was argued that rule violating behavior is the function 
of some generative factor(s). In this case the factor is anomia as it 
relates to monetary success and the achievement of desired goals.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who score high on prohibitive factors
(sanction fear and moral commitment) will report 
fewer violations than those who have low scores 
on prohibitive factors.
This is a test of the fundamental deterrence hypothesis (an 
inverse relationship between sanction fear and rule violation) with the
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addition of the other inhibitory variable of importance— moral commit­
ment. Norm internalization as an inhibitor of deviance is an important
perspective in sociology. Moral commitment and sanction fear (both formal
and informal) constitute the key elements of internal and external con­
trols.
Hypothesis 3: People will engage in rule-violating behavior only
under the pressure of the generative factor (anomia).
In other words, the generative factor is a necessary 
condition for deviance. Thus, prohibitive factors 
influence rule violating behavior only when anomia
is high. When anomia is low, there should be no
relationship between prohibitive factors and rule- 
violating behavior.
This hypothesis represents an initial attempt to integrate 
anomie theory and deterrence theory. Not only is the generative factor 
(anomia) a necessary condition for the occurrence of deviant behavior, 
but also it is necessary for the possible deterrent effects of the prohi­
bitive factors. Sanction fear will influence rule-violating behavior 
only when there is sufficient motivation to engage in deviant behavior. 
Without this motivation to deviance, the perception of punishment 
(either high or low) will have no effect on rule-violating behavior.
CHAPTER VI
METHODOLOGY
The perceptual studies in deterrence have focused on the actor's 
"definition of the situation" -- i.e., his perception of the certainty 
and severity of punishment. The strategies used by deterrence researchers 
to tap respondents' perceptions of punishment and their involvement in 
deviant activity have been numerous and varied. In this chapter we will 
present and critique survey items that have been used by deterrence 
investigators to measure various inhibitory variables including moral 
commitment. Following the presentation of these measures,the survey 
items used in this research will be outlined. Items used to tap self- 
reported violations also will be presented. This chapter will conclude 
with a brief disucssion of sampling, data collection and the statistical 
techniques used in this research. A discussion of pre-testing and subse­
quent item modifications will be found in the appendix.
Measurement of Perceived Certainty 
Perceived certainty of punishement has been operationalized and 
measured at both the formal and informal level. Perceived formal cer­
tainty concerns the actor's perception that the contemplation rule- 
violtating behavior will come to the attention of the proper authorities. 
Using stealing as an example, formal certainty would mean the perception 
of one's chances of apprehension and arrest by the police. Informal
89
90
certainty concerns the actor's perception that the behavior in question 
would be discovered by "significant others."
Deterrence researchers probably have spent more time investigating 
perceived certainty of punishment, both formal and informal, then per­
ceived severity of punishment. This results from at least two factors:
(1) most of the early studies found a stronger association between 
certainty of punishment and self-reported criminality than between per­
ceived severity of punishment and rule-violating behavior, and (2) some 
studies for example, have indicated that the effect of severity of 
punishment is mediated through certainty -- i.e., severe punishment 
deters only to the extent that it is certain.
Questions to measure perceived certainty have been asked from 
different vantage points; a general other, "someone like yourself" and 
the respondent's perception of his own chances of apprehension, Jensen 
et al. (1978) have divided the "general other" perspective into two 
categories. The first is "aggregate and qualitative."
"People who break the law are almost always caught and punished." 
The second is "aggregate and quantitative,"
Of the last one-hundred cases of (crime X) committed by a juvenile 
here in Tucson what is your guess as to the number that resulted in 
the arrest of a subject? (Jensen, Erickson and Gibbs, 1978)
Some researchers have asked certainty questions from the "someone 
like you" perspective. An example of an item from this vantage point is 
offered by Waldo and Chiricos (1972).
How likely is someone like yourself to be arrested for 
stealing something worth less than $100?
The Likert-type responses ranged from "very likely" to "very unlikely."
Bailey and Lott (1976) were among the first to ask subjects to
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"estimate their own chances of apprehension and conviction if they were 
to violate the law rather than those of a 'generalized other' or 'some­
one like themselves."’ This strategy was chosen after pretests indi­
cated that people see their own chances of arrest and conviction as 
quite different from "persons otherwise like themselves." It is assumed 
that when people are contemplating a rule-violating act they are calcu­
lating their own chances of being apprehended and punished.
Bailey and Lott asked the following questions in terms of 0 - 100 
per cent certainty.
If you were to commit each of the crimes listed below, what 
do you think your chances would be of getting caught by the 
police?
If you were to commit each of the crimes below, what do you 
think your chances would be of getting caught and convicted in 
court?
After examining the various ways that certainty items may be 
phrased, the question arises, "VVhat differences, if any, in the perception 
of certainty result from these alternative positions?" Bailey and Lott 
report that, "roughly half of the subjects see themselves as either more 
or less likely to be arrested and convicted than 'persons like themselves.'"
Comparing both "aggregate" measures of certainty (quantitative and 
qualitative) with perceived personal risk, Jensen et al, (1978:65) concude 
that:
Considerably more support for the deterrence doctrine is 
again realized in the case of the measure of perceived personal 
risk. All chi-squares for that measure are significant beyond 
the .01 level, whereas only 3 of 8 values for the aggregate, 
quantitative measure reach that level of significance. Moreover, 
each gamma coefficient for the personal measure exceeds the cor­
responding coefficient for either of the other measures of per­
ceived risk.
Measures of perceived risk are used increasingly not only because 
they lend the most support to deterrence theory but because, as previously
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mentioned, they are more in line with the deterrence doctrine.
In keeping with the current trend in deterrence research, and 
also striving for theoretical consistency (i.e., continuity with utili­
tarian thought) questions of perceived certainty in the present research 
were asked from the respondent's perception of his own chances of appre­
hension. The measures of perceived certainty, both formal and informal, 
used in this study are listed below.
If you were to cheat on the next 100 examinations taken here at the
university, how many times do you think that you would be caught by the
instructor or teaching assistant? ________
Now imagine that you were caught cheating on an examination. What do 
you think the chances are that your family would find out? (if you are 
having trouble understanding the nature of the probability please reread 
the discussion of probability above).
There is a  % chances that my family would find out if I was
caught cheating on a university examination.
Having been caught cheating on an examination what do you think the 
chances are that your 2 best friends would find out?
There is a ________% that my 2 best friends would find out if I were
caught cheating on a university examination.
If you were to steal something worth only a few dollars on 100 separate 
occasions, how many times do you think that you would be arrested by the 
police? ________
Now imagine that you were arrested for stealing something worth a few 
dollars. What do you think the chances are that your family would find 
out?
There is a  % chance that my family would find out if I were
arrested for stealing.
Having been arrested for stealing something worth a few dollars, what do 
you think the changes are that your 2 best friends would find out?
There is a  % chance that my 2 best friends would find out if I
were arrested for stealing.
^^This type of item was proceeded by an explanation of "probability."
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Measurement of Perceived Severity 
Perceived severity has been measured at the formal (sanctions 
administered by organizations, especially the criminal justice system) 
and informal (negative sanction of family, friends, etc.) level. Per­
ceptions of perceived severity of punishment like perceptions of per­
ceived certainty have been examined from various perspectives. These 
positions, along with the type of sanction used, are illustrated in 
the following table.
TABLE 3 - Type of Sanction and Orienting Perspective 
Used in Previous Deterrence Research
Type of Sanction
Formal Informal
Orienting The Bailey Grasmick




Teevan (1976) sought to determine how individuals perceived the 
severity of formal punishment for a "general other."
For all Canadians caught by the police what is their usual punish­
ment?
1. Nothing 2. Informal handling 3. Fine 4. Probation 
or suspended sentence 5. Jail
In the item above, notice that the question is phrased in terms 
of "all Canadians" as opposed to the individual respondent. Some resear­
chers have argued that people may have very different perceptions concern­
ing what would happen to them should they be apprehended as opposed to 
some hypothetical other person. These investigators have chosen to ask 
the respondent what the severity of punishment would be should he/she be 
seized by police. An example of this approach, coupled with formal
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anctions, is offered by Bailey and Lot (1972).
What do you think would happen to you if you were caught by the 
police committing the following crimes?
1. release by the police without arrest
2. arrest but no conviction
3. conviction with probation and/or fine only
4. conviction and a jail sentence
5. conviction and a prison sentence
While deterrence investigators initially limited their measures 
of severity to formal sanctions, in recent years the deterrent effects 
of informal sanctions have also been investigated. In 1977 Grasmick and 
Appleton (Table 3) looked at the "perceived threat of social disapproval 
contingent upon being exposed as an offender." In other words, they 
examined the respondent's perception of informal sanctions should he/she 
be apprehended for the violation in question.
Think of the three people you see and talk to most often.
If you were caught and fined by the police for speeding how
would each of these three people react if they found out?
Would he or she feel that breaking the speed law was some­
thing you should not have done?
The final category in the table, perceived informal sanctions for 
some "general others" makes no theoretical sense. While people may esti­
mate the perceived severity of formal sanctions for others (because they 
have some idea of how the criminal justice system works), it would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the severity of 
informal sanctions for some general other.
Another type of severity question (not included in the table) is 
designed to tap the respondents' perceptions of maximum penalties for 
particular crimes as prescribed by law. The fundamental argument for 
this type of item is basic to the general reasoning underlying perceptual 
studies, namely that people behave according to their perception or defi­
nition of the situation and not necessarily according to their perception
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or definition of the situation and not necessarily according to the 
objective situation. An item of this type is offered by Anderson et al. 
(1977j.
Could you estimate the maximum prison penalty in Florida 
for illegal possession of marijuana— first offense?
0 - 2  yrs categorized "low severity"
2 - 5  yrs categorized "medium severity"
more than 5 yrs categorized "high severity"
This type of question is a good example of a rather formidable
stumbling block in the area of perceived severity. Notice that the 
authors have predetermined what level of severity each of these penalties 
carries —  e.g., 0 - 2  yrs is labelled "low severity," etc. The problem 
is that individual respondents may have very different ideas of what a 
severe penalty is. Some respondents may think that any time spent in 
jail is a severe penalty, while others may view the 2 - 5  year sentence 
as a moderate penalty.
James Teevan (1976) took a step toward solving this problem 
when he asked the following question concerning the perceived severity 
of punishment proceeding deviance.
Before you smoked marijuana (or if you never smoked it) 
what do you think the punishment would be if you were caught?
Very severe Not so bad Nothing to worry about Nothing
A similar, although superior solution, is offered by Grasmick and Bryjak
(forthcoming 1980).
Now, for each of these things we have been talking about, 
imagine you had been arrested and found guilty and that the court 
had decided what your punishment would be. Think about what that 
punishment probably would be for you, Then indicate how big a 
problem that punishment would create for your life. Please use 
the list of choices on the card to respond to the statements I 
will read. The choices are:
1. a very big problem for my life
2. a big problem for my life
3. a little problem for my life
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4. hardly any problem for my life
5. no problem at all for my life
These investigators view a punishment as severe to the extent 
that it is problematic in one's life. This appears to be a logical 
extension, of or at least a crucial dimension of, the severity of 
punishment, i.e., a penalty is severe to the extent that it causes a 
problem in one's life. Conversely, penalties that will cause little 
if any problwm in one's life cannot be very severe.
Basically, the same measurement strategy used by Grasmick and
Bryjak was employed in this study. The following items were used as
indicators of perceived severity of formal punishment.
1. Let's suppose that having cheated on an examination you were 
caught by the instructor. Having been caught for the first time, 
what do you think would happen to you?
1. I don't think anything at all would happen.
2. I would be warned by the instructor about the conse­
quences of cheating on an examination— nothing more.
3. I would receive an "F" on that exam.
4. I would fail the exam and also be dropped from the course.
5. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course and also
suspended from school for an indefinite period of time.
6. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course and 
expelled from the University,
Now imagine that, having been caught cheating on an examination, 
the penalty that you expected was in fact imposed on you. How 
serious of a problem would the penalty be for you?
This question will be answered in the same manner that the pre­
vious questions were answered, A score of 0 would mean that the 
penalty you received would present no problem whatsoever for you 
while a score of 100 would indicate that the penalty you received 
would present an extremely serious problem for you. Your esti­
mate of the seriousness of the problem may take any value (be 
any number) between 0 and 100. Remember a score of 0 means the 
complete absence of any problem for you while a score of 100 
indicates a very serious problem for you.
2. At the appropriate place on the scale below write and circle the 
number that indicates how serious a problem for you the penalty from 
the university would be.
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 100 The penalty that I received from the Univer­
sity would present an extremely serious 
problem for me.
  50 The penalty I received from the university
would present a problem for me, although 
not a serious one.
____________ 0 The penalty I received from the University
would present no problem whatsoever for me.
3. Let's suppose that having taken something that did not belong 
to you worth a few dollars you were arrested by the police. Having 
been arrested for the first time what do you think would happen
to you?
1. I don't think anything at all would happen.
2. I would be warned by the judge about the possible conse­
quences of stealing--nothing more.
3. I would be convicted and placed on probation.
4. I would be convicted and fined up to $100.
5. I would be convicted and have to spend up to 30 days in
jail and fined up to $100.
6. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of one 
but no more than 6 months in the county jail.
7. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of 6
months but no more than one year in the state prison.
Now imagine that, having been arrested and convicted for stealing 
something worth a few dollars, the penalty that you expected was 
in fact imposed on you. How serious of a problem would the 
penalty be for you?
4. At the appropriate place on the scale below write and circle 
the number that indicates how serious a problem for you the penalty 
from the courts would be.
 100 The penalty that I received from the courts
would present an extremely serious problem 
for me.
50 The penalty I received from the courts
would present a problem for me, although not 
a serious one.
  0 The penalty I received from the courts would
present no problem whatsoever for me.
The first and third items tap the respondents view of what would
happen if he/she were caught cheating or arrested for stealing. The
second and fourth items are a measure of the perception of the severity
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of the problem should the expected penalty actually be imposed. The 
scores on the second and fourth items were the only ones utilized in 
calculating perceived severity of punishment. The difference between 
this item and the one used by Grasmick and Bryjak was in the scale 
construction. The scale used in the second and fourth items above 
approximates an interval level of measurement and can be analyzed with 
multiple regression techniques
Measurement of Moral Commitment
Recently, deterrence researchers have been interested in The 
degree to which individuals have been committed to various norms, rules 
and laws. Moral commitment, according to some sociological theories, is 
the primary determinant of conformity. Because it is an important fac­
tor in explaining conforming-deviant behavior, it has been incorporated 
by some researchers into the deterrence equation.
The notion of moral commitment is certainly not new in sociology. 
Deterrence researchers did not discover it nor are they trying to say 
that they did. In one form or another, the notion of a shared, inter­
nalized moral order has been an important concern in sociology since the 
discipline's inception. The belief that a shared moral system and a 
commitment to that system is the cement that holds society together was 
a major tenet in the sociology of Saint-Simon (Manuel 1956) and Durkheim 
(1965). While the concept of moral commitment has played a prominent
^^Previous authors have used individual Likert-type items and ana­
lyzed these findings with ordinal level statistics, most often gamma. 
Others like Silberman (1976) have constructed scales by summing a respon­
dent's scores on a particular item (perceived severity) for all offenses 
in the study. These composite scales also approximate interval-level 
data and were analyzed using multiple regression.
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role in the theorizing of many sociologists, few have tried empirically
to determine how important it actually is in explaining conforming and 
12deviant behavior. Deterrence researchers are probably the first to 
utilize the concept of moral commitment, both theoretically and empiri­
cally, in their effort to incorporate normative commitment into a more 
fully developed model of social control.
As compared to perceived certainty and severity of punishment, 
the measurement of moral commitment poses few problems. For one thing,
the measurement of moral commitment as it relates to deterrence research
only makes sense from the vantage point of the respondent. Moral com­
mitment items used by other researchers have been quite similar. Tittle 
(1977) asked respondents how morally wrong they considered each of 
nine offenses to be. "Five response categories ranging from 'not wrong 
at all’ to 'very wrong' were allowed and were scored from zero to four 
to indicate strength of moral commitment." Silberman (1976) asked his 
respondents to rate eleven offenses according to whether they were 
always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes wrong, or not wrong at all.
The measure of moral commitment used in this study is shown below.
Most people have a set of standards or rules and values by which
they try to live. These rules and values are numerous and cover 
a wide variety of behavior. A few of them are listed below. I 
would like to know to what extent you agree or disagree with 
these rules and values, that is, to what degree you think they 
are good or bad.
A score of 0 would indicate that you thought the rule or value 
was very bad and should never be followed, while a score of 100 
would indicate you thought the rule was a very good one and 
should always be followed, Your rating of the rules may take 
any value (be any number) between 0 and 100.
12Talcott Parsons, probably more than any other contemporary socio­
logist, has used the concept of moral commitment in his theorizing,
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A.  Causing someone physical harm or injury is always wrong
and can never be justified.
B.  People should always tell the truth no matter what the
consequences of their honesty may be.
C.  Cheating on examinations is always wrong, no matter what
the circumstances may be,
D.  Extra-marital sexual relations are always wrong.
E.  Stealing--even something worth only a few dollars— is
always wrong, no matter what the circumstances may be.
F.  Drinking alcohol to the point of intoxication can never
be justified.
This measure of moral commitment is somewhat different than those 
previously mentioned. Respondents were not asked to state how wrong 
they believed a particular offense was but instead to what extent they 
agreed or disagreed with particular "rules and values." Measurement of 
moral commitment using this technique more closely approximates an interval- 
level scale.
Measurement of Self-Reported Violations
Another area of controversy resulting in the use of alternative 
strategies concerns the measurement of self-reported rule violations.
Most researchers have focused on the number of rule violations the 
actor has engaged in while others have sought to ascertain the future 
incidence of criminal and deviant behavior. Each of these approaches 
has strengths and weaknesses, The problems associated with self-reports 
of past criminal behavior are discussed by Silberman (1976:44).
An important criticism of the self-report method that has 
not been dealt with adequately heretofore is the question of 
the direction of relationship between measures of deterrence 
and crime rates. Respondents are asked at a given point in 
time what their current beliefs are regarding the efficacy of 
the law enforcement process and then asked to report their 
past criminal behavior. In order to assert that these beliefs
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affect the individual's behavior, we must assume a degree of 
stability in those beliefs. However, it is equally resonable 
to assume that the respondent's current beliefs are a product 
of his past behavior, particularly if he has committed an 
offense and was not caught. Are we really testing deterrence 
theory? Or are we measuring the effects of past experiences 
on current beliefs regarding the certainty and severity of 
punishement? The truth probably lies between the extremes.
As Silberman notes, the successful resolution of this problem 
probably requires a longitudinal study, Silberman is arguing, and 
rightfully so, that behavior and beliefs are in a condition of con­
tinual interaction. This relationship takes the following form:
BELIEF BEHAVIOR BELIEF BEHVIOR, etc. Deterrence theorists
hope to capture the BELIEF BEHAVIOR relationship between perception
of punishment and self-reported violations. However, we are not mea­
suring beliefs (perceptions of punishment) before the rule-violating 
behavior but after the commission of that behavior as outlined in the 
following:
T1 T2
BELIEFS (PAST) BEHAVIOR BELIEFS (CURRENT)
Insofar as behavior influences current beliefs at time 2, we can never get
at the uncontaminated beliefs at time 1.
Tittle (1977) had respondents estimate the probability on a five 
point scale ranging from "excellent chance" to "almost no chance" that 
they would commit a number of deviant acts if, "tomorrow they were in a 
situation where they had an extremely strong desire or need to do so," 
While this approach may overcome some of the problems outlined in the 
self-reports of past deviant behavior, it also introduces new obstacles. 
The chief problem is the often noted discrepancy between attitudes or 
beliefs, and behavior (LaPierre, 1934; Acock and Defleur, 1972). Simply 
stated, people do not always do what they say they will do.
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Attitudes always produce pressures to behave consistently 
with them, but external pressures and extraneous considerations 
can cause people to behave inconsistently with their attitudes 
(Friedman, Carlsmith and Sears, 1970:385).
The strength of the "probably future deviance" approach is that 
it overcomes the problem of using present perceptions to expalin past 
rule-violating behavior. The question arises as to which of these two 
measures is superior. It is also possible they are tapping rule- 
violating behavior equally as well. One possible check on the difference, 
if any, between self-reported deviance and the probability of future 
deviance would be to obtain measures of both on the same population and 
determine to what extent they are correlated. Grasmick and Bryjak (forth­
coming 1980) found that the two measurement techniques are quite highly 
(.71) correlated. It appears that conclusions concerning the deterrent 
effects of punishment are not substantially altered by different mea­
sures of self-reported deviance. Whether one chooses to use self- 
reports of past behavior or probable future deviance, both are inversely 
related to the perceived certainty and severity of punishment.
Deterrence researchers must also be concerned with other problems 
relating to self-reported rule violations. Not the least of these pro­
blems are ones concerning the accuracy and honesty of subjects’ self- 
reported violations--i,e., the extent to which they are able and willing 
to tell the truth. Self-reports of deviant behavior have some of the 
same difficulties as victimization studies concerning accuracy. For one 
thing, respondents may forget some incidents of rule-violating behavior. 
IVhen a time frame is used (e.g., "how many times in the past year did you 
violate rule x") respondents may "telescope forward" violations that 
happened prior to the time period under consideration.
103
Concerning the honesty of answers, respondents may conceal from 
investigators the commission of, or correct number of, deviant acts. 
However, utilizing a polygraph test Clark and Tift (1963) asked 45 
subjects questions about their deviant behavior after these same 
subjects had previously answered the identical questions on an anonymous 
questionnaire. They concluded that the validity of the initial question­
naire was quite high. "The validity of the initial responses on this 
questionnaire based upon the number of items initially answered correctly 
(as determined by the polygraph) divided by the total number answered 
was 81.5 percent." The investigators found a relationship between 
response inaccuracy and "declared personal norms and reference group
lïhen deviant acts committed were at odds with personally held 
norms, the number of these acts tended to be under-reported. However, 
in 23 of 26 cases where reported violations were compatible with refer­
ence group norms, the number of self-reported violations was over­
reported, Krohn, Waldo and Chiricos (1974) found a relation between 
interview format (checklist or admitting violations to an interviewer), 
physical appearance of the interviewer ("straight" vs "hip"), and self- 
reported deviance.
In this study, as in most deterrence research, a measure of 
self-reported past rule-violating behavior was used.
Now I would like you to indicate the number of times you have 
attempted and/or actually committed these acts since the beginning 
of the past academic year (August 1978). Please be honest with 
your answers. A recent study conducted at a large Florida univer­
sity found that approximately 33% of a sample of students cheated 
when given the opportunity indicating how widespread this behavior 
is. A survey at a Pennsylvania university revealed that over 60% 
of the students questioned had previously stolen something on at 
least one occasion.
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Write down the number of times you have attempted to and/or 
actually committed these acts since the beginning of the past 
academic year.
A. ____ Took something or attempted to take something worth
a few dollars that did not belong to you. (Include 
such items as magazines and food from supermarkets, 
school supplies from the bookstore, etc.).
B. ____ Attempted to and/or actually cheated on university
examination (cheating on examinations may be done in 
a number of ways: concealing notes on your person,
glancing at your textbook, looking at the paper of 
the person sitting next to you, filling out parts of 
your bluebook before you take the exam, getting help 
on a take-home exam you were supposed to do by your­
self, etc.).
Two strategies were employed to facilitate the validity of this 
item: (1) an appeal for honest, frank responses, and (2) a brief report
of past studies that revealed a high degree of participation in these 
activities in a similar population.
Sampling and Data Collection
The "accidental" sample consisted of approximately 300 undergra­
duate students at the University of Oklahoma. The students, both lower 
and upper division, were enrolled in a number of courses (sociology, 
psychology, political science, economics and marketing) during the sum­
mer of 1979. Males and females were equally represented in the sample.
Course instructors were contacted and asked to volunteer their 
students for approximately 25-30 minutes. The nature of the study was 
explained to the instructors and their questions relating to the research 
were answered. A standard set of instructions was read to all respondents 
prior to their completing the questionnaire. Students were told that 
their participation was voluntary and that their responses would be anony­
mous and confidential. Course instructors were not present during
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administration of the questionnaire. To discourage students from rushing 
through the survey, the questionnaire was presented at the beginning of 
the class period with the scheduled presentation by the instructor to 
begin when everyone had finished.
Statistical Techniques of Analysis
The final analysis of the relationship between the independent 
variables (the inhibitory and generative factors) and the dependent 
variable (self reported violations) will be undertaken by utilizing 
multiple regression facilities of the SPSS (Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences) computer program. Multiple regression assumes that 
a relationship between some dependent variable and a set of independent 
variables is linear and additive. "The strategy then becomes that of 
producing the linear combination of independent variables which "best" 
predicts or explains the values of the dependent variable." (Soroka 
1975:14)
The "main effects" will be considered first in the analysis.
The assumption in this statistical procedure is that the basic relation­
ship between self-reported violations and various combinations of inde­
pendent variables can best be understood through a simple additive 
model.
A second set of solutions will be undertaken to test for inter­
action effects. A test for interaction is necessary when it is believed 
that the treatment effects of predictor variables (independent variables) 
are not independent of each other. If interaction between independent 
variables is occurring and not taken into account, the "best fit" will 
not be accomplished yielding inaccurate predictions. A test for inter-
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action will be made by including multiplicative terms in the regression 
equation. Hypothesis 3 from chapter 5 proposes that an interaction 
effect will be significant.
CHAPTER VII 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Introduction
Results of the data analysis will be presented in three major 
parts. In the first section we will consider univariate statistics--the 
means and standard deviations, Bivariate relationships (zero order 
correlations) between the relevant variables will be examined in the 
second section. Finally the results of the multivarate analysis (utili­
zing multiple regression techniques) will be presented. In the last 
section of this chapter we will attempt to synthesize the findings and 
determine if the three major hypotheses should be accepted or rejected.
Univariate Analysis
Table 4 contains the means and standard deviations of all of the 
relevant variables for both self reported violations— cheating and 
stealing. With the exception of self reported violations and the two 
variables which comprise the anomia— money item (money needed for desired 
life style minus monthly income) all of the variables in Table 4 are on 
a scale that ranges from 0 to 100.
Respondents indicated that they were slightly more committed to 
norms against cheating than norms against stealing with means for the 
two offenses of 83.49 and 79.69 respectively. Perceived certainty of 
formal punishment for cheating is somewhat higher than perceived certainty
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Moral Commitment 83.49 26.80 Moral Commitment 79,69 28.46
Formal Certainty 36.20 36.28 Formal Certainty 30.80 34.14
Formal Severity 76.20 22.82 Formal Severity 74.25 25.68
Family Certainty 37.87 34.58 Family Certainty 67.50 35.74
Family Severity 63.14 26.08 Family Severity 74.10 41.17
Friends Certainty 55.77 37.47 Friends Certainty 64.32 33.72




Money Needed For 
Desired Life 
Style 1003.39 775.59
Percent of Tests 
Desired Grades 
Received 69.90 21.86
Monthly Income 682.83 561.37
Number of Of­
fenses Cheating 2.28 7.59
Number of Of­
fenses Stealing 2.00 14.78




of formal punishment for stealing with means of 36.20 and 30.80. The 
perceived severity of formal punishment for the two offenses are simi­
lar with means of 76.20 for stealing and 74.25 for cheating. The data 
indicates that the perceived certainty and severity of formal punish­
ment for the two offenses are quite similar.
The analysis of informal sanctions revealed several interesting 
points. The mean score for perceived certainty-family (cheating viola­
tions) is 37.87 while the mean score for severity is 63.14. Looking at 
the mean scores for perceived certainty and severity-friends (cheating 
violations) we find them to be 55.77 and 39.73 respectively. In other 
words, certainty is lower for family than friends, while severity is 
higher for family than friends. Respondents friends are viewed as more 
likely to find out about cheating behavior than family members but are 
perceived to be less likely to administer severe negative sanctions.
Examining self-reported stealing behavior we find that the mean 
for perceived family severity (74.10) is higher than the mean for per­
ceived family certainty (67.50). The mean scores for informal sanctions- 
friends are certainty 64.32 and severity 48.64. Perceived certainty of 
punishement scores are approximately the same for family and fiends while 
severity (74.10) is considerably higher than friends severity (48.64). 
This indicates that respondents expected family members to administer 
harsher sanctions for stealing violations than friends although the 
perceived chance of discovery is almost identical for the two groups.
Looking at both offenses we find that while friends are perceived 
as likely (stealing) or more likely (cheating) to learn of the rule 
violating behavior than family members, they (friends) are not perceived 
as administering as serious sanctions as are members one one's family.
TABLE 5 - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CHEATING AND STEALING VIOLATIONS
nber of 
Fenses
STEALING N = 307
Number of 
Offenses









0 226 73.6 0 186 60.3
1 29 83.0 1 37 72.4
2 23 90.5 2 26 80.8
3 3 91.5 3 20 87.2
4 3 92.5 4 7 89.4
5 9 95.4 5 9 92.4
6 2 96.0 7 1 92.8
9 1 96.4 8 1 93.1
10 6 98.0 10 8 95.7
11 1 98.3 11 1 96.1
15 2 99.3 15 4 97.4





As might be expected, respondents indicated that it is more likely that 
their friends would leam of their cheating behavior than their family. 
Stealing, however, is as likely to be discovered by family members as by 
friends. These responses make sense in light of the fact that (1) family 
members are removed from the goings on of daily campus life, in many 
cases separted by hundreds of miles, (2) any disciplinary action short 
of being expelled from the university can probably be kept from one's 
family, and (3) getting "caught up" in the criminal justice system 
[i.e., arrested, possibly jailed and appearing in court) probably is more 
difficult to hide from one’s family, especially if it means losing a 
good deal of school time or incurring legal expenses.
The importance of getting good grades to students in our sample 
(mean score 76.28) is slightly higher than their ability to achieve these 
desired grades (mean score 69.00). This is not the case, however, con­
cerning the amount of money respondents would like to have and the 
monthly income they currently receive. Students reported a mean figure 
of $1003.00 as the monthly income they believe is necessary to lead the 
type of life style they consider appropriate at this point in their 
lives. On the average, respondents reported $682.00 in monthly income. 
This represents a more substantial goals-means disparity than we found 
for anomia-grades. This means income score indicates that students desire 
approximately 47% more money a month than they currently receive,
The number of self-reported cheating and stealing offenses is 
relatively low with mean scores of 2.8 and 2.0 respectively. The fre­
quency distribution of the dependent variables (Table 5) indicates that 
73.1% of the respondents did not report any stealing violations and 
60.2% did not report any cheating violations. Of the 83 students who
TABLE 6 - CORRELATION MATRIX - CHEATING VARIABLES
------------------- INFORM INFORM INFORM INFORM FŒWÜ IMPORT
MORAL FORM CERT CERT SEV SEV SEV GOOD





































-.0174 .1007* .2564** 1.000
1460* .0470 .1411* .0046 1.000
1256* .1528* .1494* -.1032* .4516** 1.000
.0699 .1940** .0462 -.0076 .2003** .1972** 1.000
1617* .0847 -.0223 -.0198 .1985** .1284* .2307** 1.000
.0579 .0573 -.0385 -.1078* -.0158 .0718 .0643 .1918** 1.000
-.2382** -.0678 .0111 .0882 -.0411 .0736 -.1014* .0871 -.1264* 1.000
,0534 .0118 .0193 .0058 .1408* .0239 .1147* .0073 1.000
TABLE 7 - CORRELATION MATRIX - STEALING VARIABLES
INFORM INFORM INFORM INFORM MONEY
MORAL FORM CERT CERT SEV SEV FORM NEED
COMM CERT FAM FRD FAM FRD SEV L S
NUMBER 
































.0171 .0967* .3126** 1.000
,1501* .1250* .1836** .0711 1.000
,1862** .1604* .2650** .0741 .2190** 1.000
,2079** .2605* .1388* -.0066 .1311* .3481** 1.000
*P<.05
**P<.001
-.1411* -.1646* -.0210 -.0689 -.1609* -.0861 -.1162* 1.000
-.0925 -.1109* -.0056 -.1172* -.0688 -.0248 -.0495 .6789** 1.000
-.1598* .0859 -.1270* .0799 .0983* -.1191* .0429 .0128 -.0042 1.000
-.1114* -.1113* -.0217 .0060 -.1428* -.1093* -.1077* .0239 1.000
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admitted to stealing 52 indicated they had stolen on either one or two
occasions. Of the 308 respondents 123, or 38.8%, indicated that they
had cheated at least one time during the past academic year. The 
majority of students who cheated (99) reported five or less violations.
By way of summary we can see that most of the respondents did not 
report any cheating or stealing violations and those who did engage in
these acts did so infrequently.
Zero Order Relations
An inter-correlation matrix (Tables 6 and 7) gives the direction 
and magnitude of the relationship between two variables. In terms of 
the strength of the associations, moral commitment, of all the inhibi­
tory variables, is most strongly related to self reported violations with 
correlation coefficients of -.2822 (significant at the .001 level) with 
cheating and -.1598 (significant at the .05 level) with stealing.
Concerning the correlations between self reported cheating and 
five of the six sanction variables (formal certainty, informal certainty 
family and friends, and informal severity family and firends) the 
associations are negligible and/or in the wrong direction--i.e., they 
are positively related to cheating behavior. Only perceived formal 
severity is negatively and substantially (-.1014 significant at the .05 
level) related to self reported cheating violations.
Looking at stealing violations, we see that three of the six 
correlations with sanction variables (informal certainty--friends, 
informal severity--family and formal severity) are in the wrong (positive) 
direction. The remaining associations between self reported stealing 
and sanction variables (formal certainty -.0859), informal certainty--
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family -.1270, and formal certainty— friends -.1191) are in the pre­
dicted direction, with the informal certainty relationship significant 
at the .05 level.
Moral commitment also is fairly strongly related to the sanction 
variables for each of the two offenses. With the exception of perceived 
certainty of informal punishment— friends (both offenses) and formal 
severity (cheating), the correlations between moral commitment and the 
nine remaining sanction variables are statistically significant and 
positive in direction. This suggests that respondents who are highly 
committed to the norms in question are more likely to perceive greater 
sanction fear for violations related to these norms than those people 
who are not as committed.
The generative factor of interest, anomie, is negligibly cor­
related with self-reported violations. The coefficients of .007 with 
cheating and .030 with stealing indicate that there is virtually no 
linear relationship between anomia and rule violating behavior in our 
sample. This constitutes negative evidence for the first hypotheses—  
i.e., that anomia is positively related to self reported violations.
The relationship between anomia and sanction fear is rather 
baffling. The coefficients between anomia— grades and the six sanction 
variables were all positive, although rather small, with informal 
severity-family (.1408) and formal severity (.1147) significant at the ,05 
level. Concerning anomia-money, five of the six coefficients with the 
sanction variables are negative with four of these (formal severity -.1114, 
family severity -.1428, friends severity -.1093 and formal severity -.1077) 
significant at the .05 level, While anomia-grades is positively, albeit 
weakly, related to sanction variables, anomia-money is inversely and more
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strongly related to sanction fear.
It is possible that those individuals who experience the greatest 
anoinia-grades have investigated the possibility of cheating, considered 
the certainty and severity of punishment, and found them to be high. 
However, the relatively weak relationship between these two variables 
may be the result of random or chance fluctuation. Those individuals 
who experienced the highest degree of anomia-money may have considered 
stealing and concluded that the certainty and severity of punishment is 
relatively low. It makes little sense to think that the causal sequence 
is in the opposite direction--i,e., perceptions of sanction fear cause 
anomia. Another possibility is that the relationship between anomia and 
perceived sanction fear is spurious.
The relationships between anomia and moral commitment are, as 
might be expected, negative. The correlation between anomia— grades and 
moral commitment was -.0534, and -.1114 (significant at the .05 level) 
between anomia-money and moral commitment, Conceptualizing this as a 
cause and affect relationship, it could be argued that increasing anomia 
leads to decreasing moral commitment. As the discrepancy between goals 
and means increases moral commitment to norms which specify appropriate 
conduct concerning acceptable behavior in the attainment of these goals 
decreases. It makes little theoretical sense to think that increasing 
moral commitment leads to a reduction in the goals--means disjuncture.
Other interesting correlations concern the associations between 
the six pair of perceived certainty and severity variable,s three each 
for self reported cheating and stealing. All of these combinations 
with the exception of informal certainty and severity of punishment- 
friends (cheating) are positively related and significant at the .05
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level. This suggests that respondents who perceive punishment as cer­
tain also perceive punishment as severe. In other words, respondents 
were not likely to view punishment as certain and mild or relatively 
uncertain yet severe. It appears probable that respondents perceptions 
of the certainty and severity of punishment are not arrived at indepen­
dent of one another. For example, an individual who comes to believe that 
the administration of punishment is rather certain may assume that same 
punsihment will also be severe.
The lone exception to the positive associations between the 
punishment variables is the inverse relationship between certainty and 
severity-friends, for.cheating violations. This correlation is -.1032 
and significant at the .05 level indicating that cheating behavior if 
not actually condoned by segments of the student population may nonethe­
less be tolerated. Even those respondents who perceive the certainty of 
punishment (friends] as high are likely to view the severity of punish­
ment as low. In fact, the informal punishment associated with friends 
learning of ones cheating behavior may not be viewed as punishment at 
all, More than one questionnaire contained unsolicited comments to the 
effect of, "They (two best friends) wouldn't have to find out that I 
cheated - I would tell them". Knowledge of one's cheating behavior 
then, in some groups, might not stigmatize the "offender", but rather, 
function to enhance his/her status.
Multivariate Analysis
To prevent a seemingly endless and oftentimes confusing presenta­
tions of regresson coefficients we will concentrate primarily on those 
beta weights (standardized regression coefficients) and unstandardized
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regression coefficients that are statistically significant. To obtain 
significance levels for individual beta coefficients a t-value was 
calculated for each coefficient using the following formula:
t = observed value of B minus predicted value of B
standard error of B
in other words
t = unstandardized regression minus the predicted value
_______coefficient_______________ of B which is zero (0]
Standard error of B
The value of t obviously is the unstandardized regression coefficient
divided by its standard error. If the number that results from this
division is equal to or greater than the critical value of t associated
with a particular level of significance, we will report that coefficient.
Since our hypotheses are all directional, a one-tailed test is used. We
will work at the traditional ,05 level of significance.
Moral Commitment and Sanction Fear
Tables 8 and 9 are summaries of the regression of the dependent 
variables (self reported cheating and stealing) on various combinations 
of inhibitory variables. The most substantial relationship is that 
between self reported cheating and moral commitment (-,244 significant 
at the ,0005 level). Respondents who are morally committed to the norm 
against cheating engage in significantly less cheating than those who are 
less committed. The only other statistically significant beta coeffi­
cient that resulted from the regression of cheating on the three pairs 
of prohibitive variables was that of formal severity (-,150 significant 
at the ,025 level). Neither the regression of cheating violations or 
informal sanctions-family or informal sanctions-friends are statistically 
significant. In both of these regressions informal severity of punishment
TABLE 8 - REGRESSION OF CHEATING VIOLATIONS ON VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF INHIBITORY VARIABLES
Regression Multiple R R Square
Beta
Moral Commitment t p
Violations on
Moral Comit-
ment .244 .059 -.244* 4.40 .0005
Regression Multiple R R Square Beta Certainty Beta Severity t P
Violations on
Formal Sanction








(Friends) .108 .012 .080 -.064 1.35 NS
Regression Multiple R R Square Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Form Form F am Fam Frd Frd Moral




Commitment .295 .087 -.022 -.138* .030 -.026 .072 -.020 -.230* 2.02 .0025
*P< .05
VO
TABLE 9 - REGRESSION OF STEALING VIOLATIONS ON VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF INHIBITORY VARIABLES
Regression Multiple R R Square
Beta
Moral Commitment t P
Violations on
Moral Commit­
ment .160 .025 -.160* 2.83 .005
Regression Multiple R R Square Beta Certainty Beta Severity t P
Violations on
Formal Sanc­








(Friends) .090 .008 .083 -.040 1.11 NS
Regression Multiple R R Square Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Form Form Fam Fam Frd Frd Moral








is inversely related to cheating violations while informal certainty 
of punishment is positively related to cheating violations. The final 
regression in Table 8 is the combined effect of the seven predictor 
variables on self reported cheating violations. While the value of t is 
significant at the .0025 level the impact on cheating is primiarly the 
result of moral commitment and formal severity.
When stealing violations are regressed on the inhibitory varia­
bles, the results are quite similar (Table 9). The moral commitment 
beta coefficient is in the right direction (-.160] and significant at 
the .05 level. Regressing stealing on the three pairs of prohibitive 
variables indicates that only one variable, family severity (-.137], is 
significant at the .05 level or less. The multiple R's for stealing 
violations and all three pairs of certainty and severity of punishment 
are .09 and above. The regression of stealing violations on all seven 
inhibitory variables indicates that family certainty as well as moral 
commitment have a significant effect on cheating behavior. The beta 
coefficient for friends certainty is .131 and significant at the .05 
level. However, the coefficient was positive— i.e., opposite in the 
direction that we had predicted.
To test for interaction effects between moral commitment and the 
other prohibitive variables (Tables 10 and 11] self reported violations 
were regressed on the three pairs of sanction variables (separately then 
collectively] within three categories (high, medium and low] of moral 
commitment. The "conditional" hypotheses, it will be recalled, states 
that the threat of legal punishment will have a deterrent effect only 
among those people who are not morally committed to the law. In other 
words, the effects of moral commitment and sanction threat on self
TABLE 10 - REGRESSION OF CHEATING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INHIBITORY VARIABLES


































































































































































#The disproportionate number of cases in this category is due to the large number of respondents who are 
100% committed to the norm against cheating.
*p< .05 ”p< .025 $p< .01
toN)
TABLE 11 - REGRESSION OF STEALING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INHIBITORY VARIABLES
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-.0320 -.0235 1.351 NS 
. 1685** - . 3501$$ 1.820 NS 
-.0125 -.1804* 1.1180 NS
#The disproportionate number of cases in this category is due to the large number of respondents who 
are 100% committed to the norm against stealing.
$p< .01 $$p< .005 $$$p< .0005*'p< .05 *̂ p< .025
N>oa
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reported violations are not additive but rather, interactive. We should 
expect the certainty and severity coefficients in the high category of 
moral commitment to be near zero while those in the lowest category of 
moral commitment to be both high and negative. The sanction coefficients 
within medium moral commitment should, obviously, be somewhere in between.
The findings indicate (Table 10) that coefficients for perceived 
certainty-family (.1806) and perceived certainty-friends (.1547) within 
medium moral commitment are statistically significant at the .05 level. 
These positive relationships are in the opposite direction from what we 
had predicted. Coupled with the inverse relationship between certainty 
punishment and cheating violations (-.1665)— medium moral commitment-- 
these coefficients constitute negative evidence for the "conditional" 
hypothesis. Perhaps a "medium" commitment to the norm against cheating 
still leaves considerable latitude for engaging in rule-violating 
behavior. This attitude linked with perceptions of low severity of punish­
ment may explain the positive relationship between cheating violations 
and certainty of punishment, within the category of medium moral commit­
ment.
The only other significant relationship in this table is the 
coefficient for family severity and cheating within low moral commitment 
(.5290) that is also in the opposite direction from our prediction. The 
expected high negative coefficients for certainty and severity of punish­
ment within the category of low moral commitment are not to be found for 
cheating violations. These results indicate that the magnitude of the 
effect or perceived sanction frear is not contingent upon levels of 
moral commitment in any systematic manner.
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The identical analysis performed with stealing violations (Table 
11) results in the same non-systematic findings. Within the high moral 
commitment category, stealing behavior is inversely related to certainty 
(-.2249) and positively related to severity of punishment (.2581) at 
the .05 level of significance or lower. We would expect both of these 
coefficients to be near zero. The regression of stealing violations on 
certainty and severity of punishment-friends within medium moral 
commitment results in coefficients of ,1662 and -.3784 respectively. The 
coefficient for perceived severity of friends in low moral commitment is 
in the expected direction (-.1465) and statistically significant. As we 
found with cheating violations, the regression of stealing violations 
on prohibitive variables does not support our predictions nor do they 
result in any systematic pattern of relationships.
Anomia and Sanction Fear 
In the final hypothesis we predicted that (1) the generative 
factor (anomia) is a necessary condition for deviant behavior and 
(2) that prohibitive factors will influence rule violating behavior 
only when anomia is high. Tables 12 and 13 reveal the results of regres­
sing self-reported violations on various prohibitive variables within 
high and low categories of anomia. In this analysis a residual measure
of anomia was also utilized along with the anomia differences measure,
13i.e., goals minus means. The results using both of these measures of
^^The residual measure of anomia was obtained by regressing (for 
cheating behavior) the "importance of good grades" on "the percent of tests 
the desired grades are achieved". It is a measure of grades received, 
relative to how important they are, compared to those individuals who also 
placed importance on getting good grades. For anomia related to stealing 
behavior scores of "money needed for desired life style" were regressed 
on "monthly income."
TABLE 12 - REGRESSION OF CHEATING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES






















































































































TABLE 13 - REGRESSION OF STEALING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
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anomia are approximately the same. Therefore, we will discuss only the 
findings using the goals minus means measure of anomia.
The data in Table 12 indicate that there is no relationship 
between cheating violations and either certainty (-.0870) or severity 
(.0379) of punishment within categories of high anomia. All of the 
regression coefficients within the category of low anomia are, as pre­
dicted, near zero. Although we hypothesized an inverse relationship 
between cheating and the sanction variables under conditions of high 
anomia, none was found. In fact, all of the unstandardized coefficients 
for the sanction variables were near zero within both high and low 
categories of anomia.
This same analysis, i.e., regressing violations on sanction 
variables within categories of anomia for stealing behavior (Table 13), 
reveals only one statistically significant relationship. The coefficient 
for formal severity within low anomia (-.1660) is significant of the .05 
level. According to our third hypothesis, however, sanction variables 
should not influence rule violating behavior within low anomia. We pre­
dicted that that relationship would be near zero. IVhen stealing viola­
tions are regressed on the four informal sanction variables within both 
low and high categories of anomia, there are no statistically significant 
coefficients. We predicted that the informal sanction coefficients within 
categories of high anomia would be significant and inverse,
The results of this analysis constitute negative evidence for 
the third hypothesis. Neither the regression of cheating or stealing 
violations on various combinations of sanction variables within categories 
of high anomia resulted in statistically significant inverse relationships 
as we had predicted.
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TABLE 14 - EFFECT OF MORAL COMMITMENT ON SELF REPORTED 
VIOLATIONS WITHIN CATEGORIES OF ANOMIA
1. Effect of Moral Commitment on Cheating Violations 
Category
of Anomia Standard
Differences N r  b Error t p
High 153 -.1541 -.3493 .0182 1.915 .05
Low 153 -.2136 -.3474 .0129 2.687 .005
2. Effect of Moral Commitment on Cheating Violations 
Category
of Anomia Standard















Effect of Moral Commitment on Stealing Violations
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Finally, self-reported violations were regressed on moral commit­
ment within high and low categories of anemia (Table 14]. The regression 
of cheating violations on moral commitment within the high anomia cate­
gory results in an unstandardized coefficient of -.3492, significant at 
the .05 level. The regression within the low category of anomia (-.3474) 
is also significant at the .05 level. This indicates that the relation­
ship between cheating violations and moral commitment is significant 
within both levels of moral commitment, although the inhibitory effect 
of normative commitment is strongest at low levels of anomia. The 
results of regressing stealing violations within high anomia is virtually 
non-existent (.0008) while the same regression within low anomia is 
inverse (-.1201), although not statistically significant.
By way of summary we find that moral commitment has a significant 
inhibitory effect on cheating behavior within both categories of anomia 
and no significant effect on stealing violations within categories of 
anomia. Perhaps, among members of our sample, the normative proscription 
against cheating is more important than the proscription against stealing. 
If this is the case, then throughout the entire range of anomia (low to 
high) moral commitment can function to inhibit cheating behavior. Con­
versely, the value and commitment prohibiting stealing is not as important 
to students and does not, therefore, have an inhibitory effect on stealing 
behavior.
Acceptance and Rejection of the Hypotheses
The previous sections have presented the major findings of this 
research. In this final section we will relate these findings to the 
major hypotheses. Table 15 is a summation of the first two hypotheses.
TABLE 15 - NUMBER OF CORRELATIONS AND UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS THAT 












Total Number of 
Coefficients
Number of Zero Order Correlations 
in the Predicted Direction
Number of Zero Order Correlations 
Significant at .05 or Lower in the 
Predicted Direction
Total Number of 
Coefficients
Number of Unstandardized Regres­
sion Coefficients in the Pre­
dicted Direction
Number of Unstandardized Regres­
sion Coefficients Significant at 
p. 05 or Lower in the Predicted 
Direction
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This table indicates the number of correlation coefficients, and unstan­
dardized regression coefficients that are in the predicted direction and 
are also statistically significant. Hypothesis number three, which 
predicts interaction, does not lend itself to this type of summation.
The first hypothesis stated that the higher the anomia score the 
higher the incidence of self-reported violations. Although the zero 
order correlations for violations and anomia-grades (.0073) and anomia- 
money (.0239) are in the predicted direction, they are extremely small 
and obviously not statistically significant. The first hypothesis that 
predicted a positive relationship between self-reported violations and 
anomia is, therefore, not supported.
The second hypothesis stated that individuals who score high on 
inhibitory factors (sanction fear and moral commitment) will report 
fewer violations than those who have lower scores on inhibiting varia­
bles. Both of the correlaiton coefficients between moral commitment 
(cheating -.2882 and stealing -.1598) and self-reported violations are 
statistically significant at the .05 level or better. Of the six cor­
relation coefficients between self-reported cheating and the sanction 
variables, three were in the predicted direction, but only one was sta­
tistically significant. The stealing-sanction fear coefficients are only 
slighty better. Three of these associations are in the predicted direction 
and two (informal severity family and freinds) are statistically signifi­
cant at the .05 level. While moral commitment was found to inhibit rule 
violating behavior, perceived certainty and severity of punishment (both 
formal and informal) did not have a substantial deterrent effect. The 
second hypothesis therefore received only partial and selective support.
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Although it was not incorporated into any of the formal hypothe­
ses, we did test the ''conditional" hypothesis. Table 15 indicates the 
results of regressing rule violations on sanction variables within three 
categories of moral commitment. We would expect sanction fear to have 
the greatest deterrent affect among those individuals who are less 
than highly committed to the rule or norm in question. Of the 24 regres­
sions of cheating violations on the formal and informal variables within 
low and medium levels of moral commitment, seven are in the predicted 
directon, but only one is statistically significant. The same analysis 
with stealing violations is somewhat more encouraging. Of the 24 regres­
sions of stealing on sanction variables within low and medium levels of 
moral commitment, 15 are in the predicted direction and five are statis­
tically significant. This data fails to support the conditional hypothe­
sis,
The final hypothesis states that individuals will engage in rule 
violating behavior only under the pressure of the generative factor 
(anomia). In other words, the generative factor is a necessary condition 
for deviance. Thus prohibitive factors influence rule violating behavior 
only when anomia is high. IVhen anomia is low there should be no rela­
tionship between prohibitive factors and rule violating behavior. Con­
cerning cheating behavior, there are no statistically significant regres­
sion coefficients when violations are regressed on formal and informal 
sanctions within high or low categories of anomia. These coefficients are 
in the predicted direction for low anomia, but within the category of 
high anomia we expected an inverse relationship between sanction fear and 
self-reported violations. The results are similar for stealing violations 
except that within low anomia the regression coefficient for perceived
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formal certainty is statistically significant. We had predicted that 
that coefficient would be near zero. These results indicate that anomia 
need not be present for the occurrence of self-reported violations and 
that prohibitive factors do not influence rule violating behavior only 
when anomia is high. The third hypothesis, therefore, is not supported.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction
We have argued that, until causal and control theories of deviance 
have been empirically linked and theoretically integrated, our knowledge 
and understanding of conforming-deviant behavior will be fragmented 
and incomplete. In a move toward this end, the present study attempted 
to link an etiological theory of deviant behavior with a social control 
perspective of rule violation.
Because of its rich sociological tradition in general and its 
applicability to the phenomenon of deviant behavior in particular, anomie 
theory (specifically, the subjective component) was the generative factor 
utilized in this research. The deterrence doctrine, anchored in the phi­
losophy of utilitarianism and the classical school of criminology, was 
the social control theory of concern.
In line with Merton's later thinking (1964 and 1968) on this sub­
ject, the operationalization and subsequent measurement of anomie was 
limited to the subjective component; i.e., anomia. Our definition of 
anomia, unlike Srole's (1956), focused on the actor's perception of 
specific goals and means and the discrepancy between the two.
In a similar fashion, the operationalization and measurement of 
the key concepts in deterrence theory focused on the actor's perception
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of certainty and severity of punishment as opposed to the objective cer­
tainty and severity of sanctions. Both anomia and sancton fear were 
measured from the perspective of the individual as opposed to that of 
some "general other". We were interested in how individuals perceived 
and defined issues [the amount of money they desired, the importance of 
grades, their perception of punishment) and placed themselves within an 
opportunity structure (monthly income): i.e., in the actor's definition
of the situation, This is not to say that objective circumstances (the 
extent of anomie in a society, for example) are not important factors in 
shaping individual perceptions. The objective conditions are likely to 
have an impact, and very often a significant impact, in determining the 
actor's definition of the situation; however, as we have argued previously, 
it is very possible for actors in the same objective situation to have 
different perceptions of their circumstances, to formulate various defini­
tions of the situation and, subsequently, to engage in different patterns 
of behavior. Because actors evaluate and eventually choose future courses 
of action in accord with their own defintion of the situation, perceptual 
measures of both generative and prohibitive variables were used.
From another vantage point, this research might be seen as an 
attempt (empircally though not theoretically) to link not only the theo­
ries of anomie and deterrence but also the two larger schools of thought 
in which they are grounded - classical criminology and contemporary 
positivist criminology. While this question was not the central concern 
of this study, it is an issue that eventally will have to be considered 
if criminology continues on its present course (i.e., an increased 
interest in and prolifieraton of deterrence research). It seems quite 
plausible that the marriage of various generative theories to the
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deterrence doctrine will account for a larger degree of explained variance 
in conforming - rule violating behavior than either of these perspectives 
taken separately. In other words, a move towards an empircal linkage of 
generative thereies and the deterrence doctrine appears to be fruitful 
and methodologically nonproblematic. Theoretical integration, on the 
other hand, may be a different, more difficult matter.
Summary and Interpretations
Viewed from the perspective of either anomie theory or deterrence 
theory, the results of this research are somewhat less than encouraging. 
The associations between anomia and self-reported violations, although 
in the predicted direction, were small and inconsequential (.007 for 
cheating and .024 for stealing). One possible explanation may be that 
the average goals-means discrepency for anomia-grades was rather small 
and that there was little variation. Anomia-grades had a mean of 6.37 
and a standard deviation of 1,42.
While this was not the case for anomia-money, perhaps there 
were measurement problems. It seems plausible that the goals-means 
discrepency has different meanings at various locations in the distribu­
tion. For example, the difference between $1400.00 and $1200.00 and 
$300.00 and $100.00 are both $200,00 and would, using the operationali­
zation employed in this study, yield the same anomia score. However, it 
appears reasonable to assume that these two cases might lead to different 
psychological condtions as they relate to deviant motivation. In the 
first case the $200.00 discrepency amounts to approximately 17% of the 
actual monthly income while in the second case the $200.00 discrepency 
represents a 200% goals-means difference. In addition, the first $200.00
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disjuncture is related to a relatively high monthly income (31200.00) 
while in the second case the $200.00 discrepency is in relation to a 
relatively low monthly income ($100.00). Simply speaking $200.00 means 
one thing to a person who is somewhat well-off and quite another to an 
individual who is not.
This leads us to another closely related matter. While we 
asked students how much money a month it would take to support the 
life style they considered appropriate at this time in their lives, we 
neglected to gauge the intensity or importance of this response. 
Respondents A and B might both answer that "money needed" per month was 
$700.00 while monthly income was $400.00. For A the $300.00 difference 
represents a desireable sura and would certainly be welcome but is not 
of significant importance. For B on the other hand, the $700.00 goal is 
an important one and the $300.00 discrepency represents a serious short­
coming in his life, serious enough to motivate him to rule-violating 
behavior. Goal importance or intensity, however, was accounted for in 
the anomia-grades item. The goals scale ranged from zero "Getting good 
grades is not the least bit important to me" to 100 "Getting good grades 
is the most important thing in my life these days". This item indicated 
the range of the goal and the intensity with which it was held simul­
taneously.
It is also possible that self-reported cheating and stealing 
were generated by factors other than anomia. For example alienation (an 
important aspect of conflict theory) or an excess of definitions favorable 
to violations of the law as postulated by differential association may 
have accounted for more of the variation in rule violating behavior than 
anomie. Another possibility, as outlined by Gresham Sykes (1971), is that
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a good deal of crime and delinquency, espcially among the young, cannot
be explained by "traditional" theories and may more accurately be seen as
a form of sport or play. Taking his cue from Thrasher's work on gangs
in the 20's and, more recently, Cohen's thesis of nonutilitarian behavior
in "Delinquent Boys", Sykes speculates that, "We are looking, I think,
at a new kind of crime, in the sense that it does not fit much of the
theorizing of criminology at the present."
There are also many reports that shoplifting is showing a marked 
growth not simply among the poor, but among those well up the 
socioeconomic scale and often by people who are stealing neither 
from need nor compulsion, but from a search for excitement. 
Secretaries in New York, for example, are reported sometimes 
to find stealing from Macy's far more appealing than a luncheon 
at Schraffts. (Sykes 1971:595-96)
If Sykes is on the right track, then shoplifting, for example, 
isn't stealing at all, but rather a form of amusement and, as such, is 
not considered to be wrong or in violation of a rule. It would then be 
possible to strongly agree with our moral commitment item ("Stealing - 
even something worht a few dollars - is always wrong no matter what the 
circumstances may be") and still take (not steal) something that doesn't 
belong to you because the behavior has been redefined as a form of sport 
or play. The apparent contradiction that would seemingly result in 
"cognitive dissonance" has been successfully "neutralized" because the 
behavior has been redefined as one in which criminal intent is lacking.
Turning our attention from generative factors to the inhibitory 
variables, the best predictor of self-reported violations was found to 
be moral commitment. Both coefficients (-.244 with cheating and -.160 
with stealing) were in the predicted directon and statistically signifi­
cant, This finding lends support to the work of numerous sociologists 
from Durkheim through Parsons and his followers concerning the
140
the effectiveness and power of internalized norms in predicting conform­
ing behavior. If these findings are in any way indicative of the rela­
tionship between moral commitment and various self-reported violations 
among diverse groups of people in different situations, then sociologists 
interested in social control would be well advised to pay close atten- 
ton to this variable (moral commitment] in future research.
Probably the most unexpected finding of this research was the 
lack of association between self-reported violations and perceived 
certainty of punishment. Only perceived certainty-family for stealing 
violations was statistically significant and in the predicted direction.
Our findings are unusual in light of the fact that almost all of the 
previous perceptual studies have found significant inverse relationships 
between perceived certainty of punishment and self-reported violations 
(see, e.g., Anderson e^ ̂  1977, Baily and Lott 1976, Cohen 1978, Jensen 
and Erickson 1978, Karaut 1976, Meier and Johnson 1977, Minor 1977, 
Silberman 1976, Teevan 1976 abc, Waldo and Chiricos 1972]. On the other 
hand, the lack of relationship between perceived severity of punishment 
and self-reported violations is not unusual. Of the above mentioned 
studies "only one research (Kraut] concludes that perceptions of the 
severity of punishment are part of the social control process" (Grasmick 
and Bryjak forthcoming 1980].
The regression of self-reported violations on sanction fear 
failed to support the final hypothesis, For cheating behavior there 
were no statistically significant relationships between self-reported 
violations and the certainty and severity of punishment under the condition 
of high anomia. For stealing behavior only the regression of self- 
reported violation on formal certainty within low anomia resulted in
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statistically significant relationships. We ahd predicted that the 
prohibitive factors would have a deterrent effect only under the condi­
tion of high anoraia, with no relation between punishment and violations 
when anomia was low. If cheating and stealing violations are the 
result of generative factors other than anomia, as we speculated upon a 
moment ago, then the absence of a relationship between anomia, self- 
reported violations, and the punishment variables is not unusual.
With the exception of moral commitment, none of the inhibitory 
variables was a significant predictor of self-reported rule violations. 
The amount of variance explained by various combinations of prohibitive 
variables was negligible [e.g., in the neighborhood of .015 on the 
average) i.e., regressing violations on all the inhibitory variables-- 
did not increase the explained variance and simply reflected the lack of 
associaiton of the more limited regressions. Tests for interaction 
indicated that what effects the predictor variables did have were addi­
tive and non-systematic. The one-way ANOVA runs (Appendix) failed to 
disclose any non-linear relationship.
Future Research
Given the potential methodological shortcomings disucssed above, 
it would be a mistake to abandon research attempting to link generative 
theories of anomie and deviance with the deterrence doctrine on the basis 
of the results of this one particular study. Nor should we hastily dis­
card anomie theory (as subjectiveoy conceptualized and measured) and move 
to other genrative theroies. The following is a list of factors that I 
believe will eventually result in a successful integration of generative 
theories and the deterence doctrine. These factors are presented as
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suggestions for future research.
1. Initially samples should be draivn from larger more represen­
tative populations (metropolitan Oklahoma City for example) to try to 
discern some general pattern of relationships. Later, more specific 
subgroups of the population could be examined with an eye toward any 
differences between these groups (e.g. rural-urban, young-old, various 
levels of income, education etc.).
2. While we are beginning to leam that punishment can deter 
some people from commiting specific acts in particular situations we 
may also learn that anoraia motivates certain perople to engage in speci­
fic rule violating acts in particular situations. Just as punishment 
cannot countervail all types of deviant motivation, it seem highly 
unlikely that any generative theory will be able to account for all, or 
even most, types of rule violating behavior. Research should concentrate 
on determining what types of rule violating acts are related to specific 
generative factors and how these factors, in turn, are affected by 
specific mechanisms of social control.
3. The first step in this direction would be to devise a set of 
testable propositions from the major etiological theories of crime and 
deviance, Once these propositions have been operationalized and appro­
priate measurement techniques developed, we could begin to test these 
theories and ascertain their explanatory power. It seems to me that, at 
the present timel two of the major theroies in this area, conflict and 
labelling theory, are long on theory and short on empircal research. In 
a 1975 article Tittle (p. 403) remarked that, "A search of the literature 
reveals only four studies that critically test in a meaningful way the 
effect of labelling on future conduct.’’ This is not to say that theory
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and theorizing are not important. Calhoun (1979) has made some insight­
ful observations on the relation between theory and empirical research in 
contemporary sociology.
American sociology--and to an increasing degree that of the 
rest of the world— has embarked on a hopeless program of trying 
to substitute evidence for theory. This program is hopeless not 
just because the "real world" is constantly changing and evi­
dence insufficient, but because the very idea of evidence apart 
from a substantive argument is quite meaningless (p. 684).
In a later passage Calhoun comments on the relation between 
theory and empirical analysis.
The value of looking back at classical sociological work comes 
in part from the opportunity it gives to see the construction of 
social theory through concrete empirical analysis, in rich 
historical contexts. We leam from the "founding fathers" partly 
because we have ceased to do what they did so well (p. 684).
Therein lies the key to the successful integraton of generative 
and control theories just as it is the key to the successful application 
of the sociological perspective to any social phenomenon--"the construc­
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The initial survey instrument was administered to approximately 
30 students in an introductory sociology class. Respondents were 
instructed to comment, criticize and offer suggestions for the improve­
ment of individual items while they were filling out the questionnaire. 
The following is a summary of the major revisions made as a result of 
the pre-test.
To facilitate truthfulness and accuracy of responses, the final 
questionnaire contained a summary of conclusions drawn from a similar 
study. The following statement was contained in the introduction and 
initial instruction section.
A recent study conducted in Oklahoma City, for example, re­
vealed that 23% of the sample admitted to stealing something 
worth $20 or more, 25% cheated on their income tax and 53% 
admitted to stealing something worth less than $20. As you can 
see the violation of some rules is rather common.
The original instrument asked for the respondents' "racial/ethnic 
identification." In light of the fact that so few minority students 
would probably participate in this research it was decided to drop this 
time.
The original moral commitment item asked respondents to indicate 
to what extent they believed a particular rule e.g., "Dishonest work in 
the classroom, that is, cheating is prohibited" should be applied. It 
was decided that beliefs concerning the application of a rule is not 
necessarily indicative of one's personal commitment to that rule. The 
revised item was considered a more appropriate indicator of moral 
commitment,
I would like to know to what extent you agree or disagree 
with these rules and values, that is, to what degree you think 
they are good or bad. A score of 0 would indicate that you
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thought the rule was very bad and should never be followed, 
while a score of 100 would indicate you thought the rule was 
a very good one and should always be followed.
The order of responses on both of the perceived severity of for­
mal punishment questions was changed. Concerning cheating the, "I don't 
think anything at all would happen," alternative that was originally last
was moved so that it was now the first choice. This allowed for a pro­
gression of objective formal severity items ranging from no sanction at 
all to expulsion from the university.
Let's suppose that having cheated on an examination you were
caught by the instructor. Having been caught for the first
time, what do you think would happen to you?
1. I don't think anything at all would happen.
2. I would be warned by the instructor about the con­
sequences of cheating on an examination— nothing more.
3. I would receive an "F" on the exam.
4. I would fail the exam and also be dropped from the
course.
5. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course 
and also suspended from school for an indefinite 
period of time.
6. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course 
and expelled from the university.
Several changes of the perceived formal severity for stealing
question were made, The initial and final items are presented below.
Let's suppose that having taken something that did not belong 
to you worth approximately $5 you were arrested and later con­
victed. Having been convicted for the first time what do you 
think would happen to you?
1. I would be warned by the judge about the possible 
consequences of stealing— nothing more.
2. I would be placed on probation.
3. I would have to spend up to 30 days in the county
jail and/or be fined up to $100.
4. I would have to spend up to 6 months in the county 
jail and/or be fined up to $1000,
5. I would have to spend up to 2 years in the state prison.
6. I don't think anything at all would happen.
Let's suppose that having taken something that did not belong to 
you worth a few dollars you were arrested by the police, Having 
been arrested for the first time what do you think would happen 
to you?
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1. I don't think anything at all would happen,
2. I would be warned by the judge about the possible con­
sequences of stealing— nothing more.
3. I would be convicted and placed on probation.
4. I would be convicted and fined up to $100.
5. I would be convicted and have to spend up to 30 days
in jail and fined up to $100.
6. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of
one but no more than 6 months in the county jail.
7. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of
6 months but no more than one year in the state prison.
The absence of any sanction alternative was once again moved from 
last to first. The word "convicted" was made a part of each alternative 
with the exception of the no sanction response. This avoided the con­
tradiction between "arrested and later convicted" and "I don't think 
anything at all would happen." An additional alternative, "I would be 
convicted and fined up to $100," was inserted while other alternatives 
were changed. For example, response #5 of the initial questionnaire,
"I would have to spend up to 2 years in the state prison," was changed.
It was decided that few if any subjects believed that a possible penalty 
for stealing something worth a few dollars was a 2-year prison sentence.
A more reasonable response was, "I would be convicted and have to spend 
a minum of 6 months but no more than one year in the state prison."
The items tapping respondents rule-violations were also revised.
Subjects were once again asked to be honest with their responses and
informed of the results of similar studies.
Now I would like you to indicate the number of times you have 
attempted and/or actually committed these acts since the 
beginning of the past academic year (August 1978) . Please 
be honest with your answers. A recent study conducted at a 
large Florida university found that approximately 38% of a 
sample of students cheated when given the opportunity 
indicating how widespread this behavior is. A survey at a 
Pennsylvania university revealed that over 60% of the stu­
dents questioned had previously stolen something on at 
least one occasion.
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Because the pretest revealed a rather small number of violation, 
the time frame was extended from January 1979 to August 1979 resulting 
in a one year period for possible violations. Also, respondents were 
asked to include the number of times they attempted to commit the 
violation in question. Including unsuccessful attempts indicates that 
while the violations had not actually occurred the motivation to 
deviate was still present.
Finally, the range of behavior that would constitute a viola­
tion was listed.
A. ____Took something or attempted to take something worth a
few dollars that did not belong to you. (Include such 
items as magazines and food from supermarkets, school 
supplies from the bookstore, etc.)
B. ____ Attempted to and/or actually cheated on university
examinations (cheating on examinations may be done 
in a number of ways: concealing notes on your per­
son, glancing at your textbook, looking at the 
paper of the person sitting next to you, filling out 
parts of your bluebook before you take the exam, get­
ting help on a take-home exam you were supposed to do 
by yourself, etc.).
Stating the various types of behavior that make up cheating 
should facilitate the number of self-reported violations. Listing the 
various forms of cheating should also stimulate the students memory in 
recalling previous rule-breaking activity.
Interaction--The Multiplicative Term
A test was conducted to see if there was interaction between 
perceived certainty of punishment and perceived severity of punishment 
for each of the six pairs of sanction variables (three each for cheat­
ing and stealing violations). The use of a multiplicative term in a 
regression equation provides a test for interaction (Nie e^ ̂  1975).
TABLE 16 - COMPARISON OF R FOR ADDITIVE AND INTERACTION SOLUTIONS
Cheating Violations Regressed on Prohibitive Variables
Additive R^ 2Interaction R
Formal Certainty 
and Severity .026 .0350
Family Certainty 
and Severity .0019 .0099
Stealing Violations Regressed on Prohibitive Variables
Additive 2Interaction R
Formal Certainty 
and Severity .0085 .0086
Family Certainty 
and Severity .0188 .0192
Friends Certainty 
and Severity .0081 .0088
Cn
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The equation for such a test takes the form of: = A + + BgXg +
^3^1^2‘ this equation X^Xg is the product of the two independent
variables and becomes the third "predictor". While this equation is
"still additive" in form the multiplicative term represents the "joint
effect" of X, and X_ over and above the sume of B-X, and B_X_ (Nie et al 
1 / 11 z z ----
1975).
Table 16 contains the R squares (both additive and interaction) 
for the six pairs of sanction variables. The results indicate that the 
inclusion of the multiplicative term in the regression equations has 
virtually no effect -- i.e., the increased productive power is negli­
gible. The miniscule R squares in the additive models have not been 
significantly raised.
Nonlinear Relationships
The underlying logic of regression analysis assumes not only 
that the relationships among the variables is additive, but also that 
the relationships are linear, Standard multiple regression techniques 
are not sensitive to curvilinear relationships. A nonlinear relation­
ship could exist and consequently remain hidden for the researchers.
Since so many of the predicted associations between sanction 
fear and self reported violations were not found it was decided to test 
for the presence of curvilinear relationships. If the underlying 
bivariate relationship is expected to take a particular form, it may be 
possible to restate that relationship in a linear form by transforming 
the original variables (using a log transformation for example). How­
ever, if the form of the underlying bivariate relationship is not inown, 
this method becomes a series of stabs in the dark with success (i.e..
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hitting upon the right solution of form) no more than a matter of 
luck.
Perhaps the most expedient method for detecting the presence 
of nonlinear relationships is through the use of analysis of variance 
(Anova). In this case, a one-way ANOVA was run with the dependent 
variable and each of the prohibitive variables. A total of twelve 
one-way ANOVA's were run, six with self reported cheating and the 
sanction variables and six with stealing and the sanction variables.
The dependent variables were divided into quintiles. This five-level 
breakdown allows us to see if there are any different effects within 
levels of the dependent variable that are caused by increases \in the 
independent variable. The means of the quintiles of the dependent 
variable are then plotted. The following is an example of this pro­







Plotting these mean scores indicates that there is no nonlinear 
relationship of any kind between these two variables. The same proce­
dure was followed for the remainder of the dependent variable and 
sanction variable combinations (11). The results indicate that there 
were no curvilinear relationships of any consequence,
